

The
S. O. S.
Indian State Forces
JAIPUR
1928

BY

Captain SYED NAZEER ALI,

ADJUTANT.

2ND BAHAWALPUR HAROON INFANTRY.

BAHAWALPORE.



he Ruler of
orc.

DEDICATED

TO .

HIS HIGHNESS

RUKN-UD-DAULA, NUSRAT-I-JANG, HAFIZ-UL-MULK, MUKHLIS-UD-DALL.

CAPTAIN SIR SADIQ MOHAMMAD KHAN V.

ABBASI


K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.

NAWAB

OF

BAHAWALPORE

STATE



Foreward

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ADVISER
Indian State Forces

Dated, Bikaner, 25th February, 1930.

I much appreciate the honour of being asked to write a short Foreward for Captain Syed Nazeer Ali's book on the Senior Officers' School held at Jaipur in 1928.

As an Officer who had to conduct a similar School in Gwalior in 1929, I fully realize the value of a privately written work on the conduct of the course, that is to say a human account of the daily round of work and play as distinct from the Formal and Official Report of the Commandant himself.

Only three Senior Officers' Schools have so far been held for Indian State Forces, but their value is already manifest, not only in the Tactical knowledge gained by students in the handling of their own and other arms, but equally important, the broader outlook on life in general which is engendered by meeting brother officers of the Indian States.

This is a point that cannot be too deeply stressed. The more Officers of one State can mingle with the Officers of other States and of the Regular Indian Army the broader will be their outlook, and the greater their usefulness.

In addition to new ideas circulating, new friendship will be made, and here Captain Syed Nazeer Ali's book

will be of great value in helping Officers to recall a pleasant and useful 3 months of their lives, and to recollect the new friends they made.

Should this book be first step towards encouraging the establishment of Indian State Forces' Quarterly or Annual Magazine a very useful work will have been accomplished.

MAJOR K. D. BARBOUR, M. A

PREFACE.

My aim in giving an account of the Senior Officers' School (I. S. F.) is twofold. Firstly to introduce the intending candidates to odds and ends, the knowledge of which, I am sure would prove helpful to them.

Secondly my object in writing this book is to induce the Officers especially gifted with literary talents, to compile a more useful and adequate account of the Senior Officers School in its later years.

25th September, 1929.

NAZEER.

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ETCETERAS.

IN AND OUT OF THE SCHOOL.

To be short and simple. I think, it is an exact explanation of the School's routine, to say, that there were every day :—

1. Lectures to hear.
2. Lectures to deliver.
3. Demonstrations to watch.
4. Schemes to do.
5. Parties to attend.

1. LECTURES TO HEAR.

Lectures of great usefulness and of Military importance as they are given on the weekly programmes were delivered to the class by the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and by a number of experts—British Officers—belonging to the various services of the Army.

Remember that it is almost impracticable to retain every thing that you hear. Record what is useful and important in the lecture. Arrange and keep your notes up to date. Never treat them as unnecessary. Your notes would assist you off and on at the school and afterwards.

2. LECTURES TO DELIVER.

Every student officer is expected to lecture on any or other subject of his own choice.

If you want to make your lecture a real success, start writing it early. There is not much time at your disposal as it would appear to you. Day by day and week after week you will find your work increasing more than it was in the beginning. My bath time afforded me the seclusion to go on giving perfection to my lectures bathing and rehearsing at the same time.

3. DEMONSTRATIONS TO WATCH

Every demonstration, to make it easy, was preceded by a lecture in the class room. Try to follow the lecture punctually in the light of the maxim.

4
"Take care of your pennies and the pounds will take care of themselves."

Do not enjoy demonstrations as *Tamashas*. Demonstrations are the alphabet which we later build into schemes.

4. SCHEMES TO DO.

Students in pairs conducted the schemes given in this book.

If you follow your lectures and watch the demonstrations carefully it will be easy for you to conduct your scheme faultlessly.

5. PARTIES TO ATTEND.

That one should be social in our meetings and thankful in feeling is a suggestion worth following.

READING & RIDING.

READING.

A couple of centuries back, an army was not burdened with literature to such an extent as it is to-day.

I do not think, old Alexanders or ancient Hannibals without receiving their training and education at Sandhurst will be able to-day to invade Italy or India as easily as they did in times gone by.

Day by day the world is getting enormously multiplied in all its phases. To-day one has to fight in far off lands with strange peoples and in severe climates.

A general to-day, like an actor in a theatrical performance, is now a king, another moment a slave or a merchant and so on, and has to act as many persons at a time. A general of a force is expected to be its gunner, a pilot, a sapper, a scout and a signaller, etc.

To be able to handle one's command efficiently, one has got to be efficient in the use and applications of all the arms under one. *e. g.*, a platoon commander is supposed to

be able to use and apply his bayonets, bombs, rifles and Lewis guns to the great purpose they have been designed for. The higher you rise in the capacity of your command the wider you find the sphere of your responsibilities.

The increase in responsibilities in the army involves a commander that he should know and acquaint himself, with all he is likely to be confronted with.

For example, how are you going to defend yourself from air-crafts, when you are ignorant of the air-crafts of present times.

"Some books are to be tested, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested. i.e., read wholly with diligence and attention." Says Lord Bacon in his essay on "Studies".

"In reading a purely informative book, the reader must put out a certain amount of effort." (John Adams, M.A., B.Sc, LL.D.)

"Be thorough in every study; passing over a field of study has been graphically compared to conquering a country. If you roughly conquer every thing you meet you will pass on from victory to victory, but if you leave here and there a fort or a garrison not subdued, you will soon have an army hanging on your rear, and your ground will soon need re-conquering. Never pass over a single thing, however minute, or apparently of little consequence, without understanding all that can be known about it." (Dr. John Todd, D. D.)

RIDING.

At the Senior Officers School, often the officers are required to ride for long hours, sometimes the officers happen to mount a vicious animal and frequently over broken grounds.

It is therefore advisable that the officers (especially Infantry officers) must come to the School qualified in riding.

CATCH TIME BY THE FORELOCK.

By the end of April 1928, all details and informations concerning the Senior Officers Class, to be held at Jaipur (from the beginning of October to the middle of December) were communicated to all concerned. A proposed programme and a list of Training Mannuals, likely to be studied and carried out during the course of instructions at the S. O. S., were made known to all the intending candidates 6 months prior to the date of their issue.

Inspite of the above timely information as far as I could find out, from my brother Officers, in the Class later, on none of us was thoughtful enough to have gone through the suggested programme in accordance with the instructions circulated.

During the instructions, whenever, I went prepared for my next lessons, I found myself quite a different man in the class, for, the schemes with all their significances and references appeared to me simple, easy and interesting.

But, how very sorry, am I to state that I was able to enjoy this boon very sparingly. *Why was I unable to enjoy it too often?* Because too often I went to the class unprepared.

Why I went to the class unprepared too often?

Because I had then no time to prepare myself thoroughly in all the different subjects, required to be studied in the next day's programme.

It was then that I realised the charms and delights of a prepared Senior Officer.

The right way of preparing oneself for the S. O. S. is to read and re-read the Training Mannuals before comming to the School.

Important sections and chapters in the Traning Mannuals are given in this book as an appendix along with reference to the weekly programmes. I hope the knowledge and study of these sections and chapters would much facilitate the School-task, for those who care to catch time by the forelock.

IF YOU ARE IN ROME DO AS THE ROMANS DO.

As regards their habits, customs and living, it is not an exaggeration to say that the officers came to the School in 1928, as Senior Officers were of these three different types :—

1. The Modernised.
2. The half way between East and West, i.e. the Moderates.
3. The Orientals.

To go into the details of each of the above categories in order to support my views, I would be required to write the general situation of the entire world of to-day stirring to new ideas, new impulses and new aspirations.

But with the limited scope of this little book, I am obliged to be contented with this remark only :—

If you are in Rome do as the Romans do.

Owing to the absence of some suitable and permanent arrangements, the Officers for boarding, lodging and for their very many other comforts are required to be residents of an up-to date first class hotel. Under such circumstances I on the merit of my personal experience suggest the Officers to be able to adapt themselves to the decent forms and fashions of the human life of to-day.

Since during your stay at the S. O. S. you will either be required to be guests to several At Homes, Tea Parties and dinners, it is therefore advisable for you to be in possession of suitable and appropriate kit for these occasions

SOMETHING ABOUT JAIPUR.

SCENES AND SIGHTS.

For its architectural beauty and natural scenery Jaipur ranks among the best Indian cities.

Jaipur Museum is by far the best of all the Museums in this country. The town is a fortified town with very wide streets and fine mettaled roads.

Ram-Nawas, Nahar-Garh, Galtā-Ambher and Amar-Garh are in Jaipur the chief places of interest, where the

American tourists and others swarm through-out the year.

Jaipur Hotel where the Senior Officers were housed for boarding, lodging and living is comfortable.

TEAS AND TRIPS.

All the State Officers from different States, who attended the Jaipur S. O. S., are very thankful and are indebted to the authorities and gentry of Jaipur for the care and comforts that they received during their stay in Jaipur.

The following gentlemen and Units entertained the senior officers :—

The Resident Jaipur State.

The President Jaipur Durbar.

Kanwar Mool Singh Ji.

Bhero Singh Ji and Ranjit Singh Ji.

Thakar Devi Singh Ji Chamoo, Military Minister, Jaipur Durbar.

Colonel Thakar Amar Singh Ji of Kanota.

Mr. Wali Ahmad Khan Sahib, Sahib-zada of Tonk.

Prof. Md. Hami-ud-Din Khan, M. A., Maharaja College.

Jaipur.

Jaipur Lancer.

1st Jaipur Infantry and Transport Corps.

Captain H. D. H. Y. Nepean, D. S. O., Commandant, S. O. S.

The senior officers inspite of their being very few in number, managed to represent the school by a hockey team and a cricket eleven.

Some of the following interesting matches were played :—

1st Jaipur Infantry *versus* S. O. S..

S. O. S. *versus* Maharaja College.

A cricket and a hockey match were also played with the Maharaja's teams.

The young Maharaja Sahib played for both his teams. The young Maharaja Sahib is an alround very keen sportsman.

ADDRESS BY MAJOR GENERAL G. A. H. BEATY,
C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., MILITARY ADVISER-IN-CHIEF,
INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Early in December 1928, Major General Beaty, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., visited the School. He addressed the Officers in the Class in a short speech as under:—

Gentlemen—It is to me of intense pleasure, and of tremendous value to see that we all meet here. I do not care much about your Schemes or Lectures. What I care more is, that by coming to this School, we get a better chance to be able to know more of each other."

TACTICAL EXERCISES

W. T.

BY

SENIOR STATE OFFICERS

AT


THE SENIOR OFFICERS'

SCHOOL.

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NOTE :—

For map reference please avail yourself of Rajputana map, Sheet No. 260.



T. E. W. T. ATTACK

BY

COL. BHALOO SINGH

AND

MAJOR BALDEO SINGH

Reference—Map of Rajputana Sheet 260 (1 inch = 1 Mile).

NARRATIVE. — JAIPUR AND TONK STATES are at War.

The boundary between these States runs along a line drawn East and West of CHAKSU (off the map). G. O. C. Jaipur Forces on 5th Nov. 1928 receives information at 2300 hrs. that enemy one Bde. Inf., one Pack Battery, one Sqn. Cav., one Armoured Car Coy. have crossed the boundary and occupied SANGANER at 2000 and intends to advance on Jaipur when reinforced by another column consisting of all arms from Tonk which is expected to arrive at 2000 hours on 6th November 1928.

G. O. C. JAIPUR Forces orders a column as under to proceed at 0600 hrs. on 6 Nov. 1928 to drive the enemy force out of SANGANER and organize a defensive position:—

Hd. Qrs.

"A" Sqn. Jaipur Lrs.

1st Field Bde. R. A.

3rd Mountain Battery.

2nd F. Co. R. E.

1st Jaipur Bde:—

1st Jaipur Inf.

2nd " " "

3rd " " "

4th " " "

4th Armoured Car Co.

3rd F. Amb.

At 0700 hrs. the column arrives at level crossing (T 0324) message is received from Adc. Gd. Commander that enemy estimated 2 Bns. Inf., 1 Bty. have taken up a position East and West of road at DURGAPUR on a frontage of 1600 yds. and Adv. Gd. is held up.

O. C. JAIPUR Column rides forward to Adc. Gd. Comdr. to find out the situation. sends for unit comdrs. to meet him at 4 mile stone, makes personal reconnaissance, decides to attack and capture DURGAPUR with two Bns. in front supported by artillery and armoured cars and on arrival of unit Comdrs. issues his orders.

PROBLEM I. You as O.C. Column write out a message from the orders you will issue.

PROBLEM II. As O.C. 1st JAIPUR INF. on receipt of orders from O.C. Column describe your plan of action and the orders you issue.

PROBLEM III. As O.C. "A" Coy. on receipt of orders from your C.O. what action will you take and orders will you give?

PROBLEM IV. You are No. 5 Section Comdr. Your section scouts are fired on from that high ground (pointed out) and one man is killed, what will you do?

PROBLEM V. You are No. I Pln. Comdr. your forward section is held up by enemy fired from that high ground (shown). Describe your action.

PROBLEM VI. The enemy V. G's are located firing from N. W. corner of that wood (pointed). What message will you send?

SCHEME NO. 1 ADVANCE GUARD

TACTICAL EXERCISE WITHOUT TROOPS.

BY

COL. GURDIAL SINGH

AND

LIEUT. IMRAN SHAH KHAN

Rendezvous — 3 Mile stone JAIPUR-AJMER ROAD.

Reference — Map No. 45 $\frac{N}{9}$

Date — 9th November 1928.

GENERAL IDEA.—The two important States JAIPUR (T. 49 Sq.) BAGRU (X 58) RASARPURA and BOURI are the Frontier towns of JAIPUR State. BAGROTA UDHAS is the frontier town of BAGRU State. Lines of boundary of these two States run from North towards South.

Both State armies have aeroplanes.

Aerodromes are situated at Ajmer for Bagru State.

Bharatpur for JAIPUR State.

JAIPUR is the divisional Headquarters of JAIPUR. State garrison as follows:—

One Cavalry Regiment.

One Brigade Field Artillery.

One Pack Battery.

Divisional Ammunition Column.

Two Infantry Brigades.

One Company Armoured Cars.

Three Field Ambulances.

The strength armaments training and morale of the hostile forces are equal to that of ours. All the cart tracks are passable by all arms.

NARRATIVE.—Some internal trouble has suddenly arisen in the both States, war has been declared on the 8th Nov. 1928 at 1900 hrs. Reliable information has been received at 2000 hours that the enemy's strength about one squadron Cavalry, two Battalions Infantry, and one Battery is at BAGROTA UDHAS.

The G. O. C. JAIPUR Division ordered the Col. Commandant of 1st JAIPUR Infy. Brigade Group strength as per margin. march tomorrow on the 9th November 1928 at 0700 hours to hold our frontier town and defeat the enemy wherever met (but not to cross the boundary) The JAIPUR Infantry brigade group are in bivouac on Club POLO ground (S94 Sqr). R.A.F. BHARATPUR have been ordered to reconnoitre area between BAGRU and BAGROTA and report on any hostile movements.

1st Infy Bde. Group under }
 Brigadier.
 X Bde. Headquarter.
 B Squadron
 JAIPUR Lancers
 Two F. Batty. R. A.
 One Pack Batty. R. A.
 Infy. Bde. }
 One Sec. F. Co. S. & M.
 1st JAIPUR Infantry
 2nd " "
 3rd " "
 4th " "
 1st Field Ambulance
 Bde Ammunition
 Column. }

PROBLEM I. As a Brigadier Infantry Brigade after appreciation of the situation write out your order for your column.

Note.- Issud to the students one day before the scheme the solution will be discussed on the place of rendezvous.

Time—15 minutes for discussing.

SITUATION 1. At 0645 hours the head of the van Guard arrives at 3 mile stone.

PROBLEM II. At 0645 hrs. as O.C. advance Guard show the disposition of your advance Guard with rough sketch.

Time—7 minutes.

Discussion for 8 minutes.

SITUATION 2. At 0645 hrs. the adv. Gd. Mtd. Troops reach 4 miles stone and heavy fire is heard from both flanks and you receive message from your flank troop commanders that a body of enemy estimated troop in each case in West holding bank of Nullah at S 8552 and S 7929 and their advance held up. On account of heavy rains yesterday. the Nullah is impassable except by road and cart tracks.

PROBLEM III. Appreciate the position from the point of view of the O.C. advance Guard, Mounted Troops, and how you deal with the situation.

Time 10 minutes.

Discussion 10 minutes.

SITUATION 3. At 0725 hrs. the head of the main guard reaches $4\frac{1}{2}$ mile stone. A hostile aeroplane flying along the road from East to West at the height of 500 feet.

PROBLEM IV. What action does the main guard take?

Time 3 minutes.

Discussion for 2 minutes.

SITUATION 4. At 0720 hrs. adv. gd. mounted troops hold up by heavy Rifle fire at the 6th mile; the O.C. adv. gd. receives a message from the advance guard mounted troops, that his advance is held up by one Coy. of Infy. and two Troops of Cavalry on the flanks occupying a position near the $6\frac{1}{4}$ mile. The head of the van guard is at $4\frac{1}{2}$ mile stone.

PROBLEM V. As an O.C. van guard what is your sequence of action?

Time 10 minutes.

Discussion 10 minutes.

SITUATION 5. Your attack is successful, and the enemy retires towards high ridges along the road (P.O.) the Advance continues a short way, and is definitely held up near the $6\frac{1}{2}$ mile, and you estimate that the enemy's strength is 2 companies of infantry supported by artillery.

PROBLEM VI. Write down the message to the advance guard Commander.

Time 10 minutes.

Discussion 5 minutes.

SCHEME ADVANCE GUARD (T.E.W.T.)

BY

MAJOR RAGHBIR SINGH, I. D. S. M.,

AND

CAPTAIN SYED NAZEER ALI

Reference—Map Rajputana Sheet No. 260 & 259.*Rendezvous*—S 9865 Near Water Tanks.*Dated 29th November 1928.*

GENERAL IDEA.—CHAMOO a subsidiary State. JAIPUR a paramount State. Both the States are equipped with modern arms. The tracks are passable for all Arms. AMANISHAH Nallah with a stream 25 yds. wide 7 feet deep with a speed of 2 miles per hour is unfordable.

NARRATIVE.—Reliable information that CHAMOO having allied with others, two subsidiary States, intends to throw off the yoke of the JAIPUR State. The strength of the three subsidiary States is together equal to the strength of JAIPUR Force. On 28th November 1928 at 1530 hrs. enemy's patrols estimated 1 Squdn. Cavy. 12 miles N. W. of JAIPUR. Boundary between the two States is from point map reference No. 259 L 23532 M 3555.

G. O. C. JAIPUR Force with the intention to nip the revolt in bud at once details column composed of—

- 1 Squadrn. Cavy.
- 1 Bde. Fd. Arty.
- 1 P. Batty.
- 1 Infy. Bde.
- 1 Armoured Car Coy.
- 1 Coy. S. & M.
- 1 1st Fd. Ambulance.

To march early on the morrow morn. 29th November 1928 at 0730 hrs. along the track running parallel to hills north of JAIPUR—(T 9860—S 9974—S 9089.) Column is clear point T 0565 by 0745 hrs.

PROBLEM I. What troops will you detail as your Advance Guard.

PROBLEM II. Give the order of march of Advance Guard.

PROBLEM III. As O. C. Column how will you employ your Arm. Car.

PROBLEM IV. An aerial message reports the movements of the hostile mounted troops on the other side of the Nallah at 0815 hrs. at point S 9081.

As O. C. Advance Guard how will you cross it. Give your verbal orders.

NARRATIVE 5. A message from Van Guard reports that enemy approximately 1 Coy. with 1 Section V. G. in position at points S 9382 astride track advance is held up.

PROBLEM V. What will you do as O. C. Advance Guard? Give your verbal orders.

NARRATIVE 6. Your attack from the right is successful the enemy retired as when you were to rejoin the Main Guard.

The Coy. carrying flank attack is fired upon from North East of the wood.

PROBLEM VI. What will you do as O. C. B. Coy.? State disposition.

PROBLEM VII. What do you think about the hills pointed out?

SCHEME

OUTPOST

BY

COL. T. DEVI SINGH JI

AND

CAPTAIN ABDUL JABBAR KHAN

*Reference — RAJPUTANA sheets No. 259 & 260.**1 inch = 1 Mile.*

NARRATIVE.—A Khaki Force from JAMNA RAMGARH is advancing *Via* JAIPUR towards SAMBHAR. It has passed through JAIPUR and is halting at 1600 hrs. for the night at reference map 260. T. 0359.

It is composed of the following strength:—

- 1 Cavalry Regt.
- 2 Fd. Bdes. Artillery.
- 1 Pack Battery.
- 2 Bdes. Infantry.
- 2 Secs. D. A. C.
- 1 Arm'd. Car Coy.
- 1 A. C. Squ. R. A. F.
- 2 Fd. Ambulances.
- 2 D. T. Transport Trains.

At 1530 hrs. on the 15th November the Force Commander received information through the R. A. F. that:—

1. The SAMBHAR enemy Force composed of about one Cavly. Regt. was seen moving in easterly direction near NAMBAGAN, map 259. K. 7517.

2. Main Force of the enemy composed of about 2 Bdes. Infy. 2 Pack Batteries and one Fd. Bde. Artillery and one Armoured Cars and Aeroplanes. was seen moving in the Easterly direction at BHAGILA, map 259 K. 4932.

The Khaki Force Commander thereupon details 3rd and 4th Infy. Bns. with two Fd. Batteries for outpost duty West of JHOTWARO along a line running from point map S. 9179 to North West corner of JHOTWARO Garden point map S. 7569 and to PEMPURA point S. 7949 inclusive.

O. C. Outpost allots No. 1 Sector for 3rd Infantry from inclusive point S. 9179 to inclusive JHOTWARO. No. 2 Sector for 4th Infy. from exclusive JHOTWARO to inclusive PRAMPURA. The outpost Troops will be relieved by Adv. Guard Troops. at 0700 hrs. on the 16th.

PROBLEM I. What would the O. C. 4th Infy. do on the receipt of the above orders?

Time—5 plus 10.

SITUATION. O. C. 4th Infy. has done personal reconnaissance and the Coy. Commanders meet him.

PROBLEM II. What will the O. C. Infy. tell his company Commanders and V. G. Officer?

Time—20 plus 15.

PROBLEM III. What action the A. Coy. Commander takes after having received orders from O. C. Battalion?

Time—15 plus 15.

PROBLEM IV. What will the O. C. No. I Picquet do on receipt of the above orders?

Time—15 plus 15.

PROBLEM V. Naik X is ordered from No. I Picquet to carry out one of the Patrols with his 3 Sepoys starting at 0100 hrs. Describe his arrangements and action.

Time—5 plus 10.

PROBLEM VI. The Leading Sepoy is captured by the enemy in the Garden in front. What information he is authorised to give to the enemy?

Time—2 plus 5.

SCHEME CAVALRY IN THE RETREAT

C. T. VOL II CHAP. I SEC. 8

BY

MAJOR KADAM

AND

CAPTAIN SYED AHMED

Rendezvous—Reservoir.*Time*—0730 hrs.*Date*—12-12-28.*Ref.*—Map sheet Nos. 259 and 260 Jaipur.

NARRATIVE.—As a result of existing hostilities between JAIPUR and CHAUMU a Jaipur Bde. of all arms was operating in the vicinity of Doulatpura (L 52). At 1800 hrs. 11th Dec. the Bde. Commander receives an order from G.O.C. Jaipur recalling the Bde. to Jaipur.

Accordingly the Bde. Comdr. decides to commence the withdrawal at 0500 hrs. on the 12th Dec. and intends to retire along the track running through Bindhar (L 60) to Jaipur, just East of the railway line.

At 2000 hrs. on the 11th Dec. the Bde. Comdr. summons the O.C. Jaipur Lancers and says to him, "I have received reliable information that some enemy Cavalry and Infantry were seen going into Bivouac this afternoon at Nangal (L 83). I expect my retirement to be intercepted, therefore I want you to protect my left flank throughout the retirement."

PROBLEM I. As O. C. Jaipur Lancers appreciate the situation
(*Appreciate while riding out to rendezvous*).

SITUATION I. Having arrived at *Harmaro* you find no sign of the enemy.

PROBLEM II. In what formation will you move to the next bound?

SITUATION II. You have arrived here having selected this as your next bound. You receive information from your

patrol that the enemy estimated at two Squadrons of Cavalry and one Bn. of Infantry are just debouching from the pass (P. O.). The rear Guard of your column is just by that (P. O.).

PROBLEM III. (a) How do you decide to act?

(b) Show the exact dispositions of your troops on the ground.

SITUATION III. The enemy is seen deploying for attack and his cavalry is concentrating on the right (P. O.)

PROBLEM IV. Very soon you will have to retire. What considerations have you to make before moving to the next position?

PROBLEM V. You have been detailed by the O.C. to select the next position. Ride back and select which you think will be the next position that will be occupied.

PROBLEM VI. You are commanding the Squadron which is occupying this hill, there are no more troops on your right and you see a Sqn. of enemy Cav. working round your right flank. What will you do?

SITUATION VI. You have decided to make Amaji Sha Nullah your next bound and have arrived here, closely followed by the enemy Cavalry.

PROBLEM VII. (a) What advantage do you think you can derive from this obstacle.

(b) Supposing you wanted to ambush them, how would you plan it, keeping in consideration the safe extraction of your own troops?

SCHEME CAVALRY IN PURSUIT

BY

MAJOR HAYAT MIR KHAN

AND

CAPTAIN DHERAK RAM

Reference—Map Rajputana Sheet No. 260 (1" = 1 Mile.)

NARRATIVE.—The frontier between two belligerent States EASTLAND and WESTLAND runs across Samori (R 97) Bagru (Y.99) and SIRONI (Y 05) JAIPUR is an important manufacturing town in EASTLAND with garrison of one Bn. Infy.

On the evening of the 25th Nov. 1928 the O. C. Jaipur garrison received a report from his spies that enemy's force strength one Sqn. Cav. one Mountain Bty, and two Bn. Inf. left Bagru (K-58) and were advancing on JAIPUR with the intention of capturing it.

During the night 25th/26th Nov. O. C. JAIPUR Force received reinforcement by train of one Sqn. Cav., one Mountain Bty. and two Bns. Infy.

The O. C. JAIPUR garrison taking advantage of the enemy's ignorance of the reinforcement, marched on the morning of 26th Nov., 1928 at 0530 hrs. and had a fierce battle with WESTLAND force West of AMANISHAH Nullah immediately NORTH AND SOUTH of road JAIPUR-AJMER about 5th Mile stone.

SITUATION.—The enemies were surprised, suffered a serious reverse, and received very heavy casualties both to Cav. and Inf. with little loss to JAIPUR Force. At 0700 hrs. the JAIPUR Force were holding position across the 5th Mile stone road JAIPUR-AJMER, while the Cav. concentrated about copse (S-7747) (SOUTH of PEMPURA. At 0730 hrs. the JAIPUR Force Comdg. receives information that the enemies are retiring along the road JAIPUR-AJMER.

PROBLEM 1. As O. C. JAIPUR Force what action will you take and what orders will you give to your Cav.

PROBLEM 2. As Sqn. Comdr. state your plan of action and in what formation you would move?

SITUATION II. The enemy have forestalled the sqn. and have taken up a position NORTH of HIRAPURA, as the ground scouts arrived there, are fired upon.

PROBLEM 3. What action does the Sqn. Comdr. take?

PROBLEM 4. As Sqn. Comdr. you find that the strength of the enemy holding this position is about two Cav. troops. What will you do?

SITUATION III. The Sqn. was successful in driving away the enemy's Cav. with small loss, from NORTH of HIRAPURA, but as he was continuing his advance to his objective, came under a heavy small arms fire from that copse (point out).

PROBLEM 5. As Sqn. Comdr. what action will you take?

SITUATION IV. The enemy hardly pressed by JAIPUR Force and threatend by the Cav. on his left rear, is retiring towards those ridges (point out) in great haste, confusion and disorder.

PROBLEM 6. As Sqn. Comdr. what action would you take and what will be the orders you give?

SCHEME ATTACK

BY

MAJOR BALWANT SINGH

AND

CAPTAIN JAWALA SINGH

Reference—Rajputana Sheet No. 260. 1 inch = 1 mile.

GENERAL IDEA.—NORTHLAND Column has defeated Southland on the evening of the 21st November 1928, in a battle south of Jaipur. SOUTHLAND retired South along the Railway towards Chaksu. O.C. NORTHLAND Column decided to continue the advance on the morning of the 22nd Nov. 1928. R. A. F. have been ordered to co-operate with our Bde. are reconnoitering between JAIPUR AND SANGANER.

NARRATIVE.—‘A’ sqd. Bhopal Lancers.

3rd Field Bde. R. A.

3rd Kashmir Pack Bty.

3rd F. C. R. E.

No. 2 Sec. ‘A’ Echlon 1st D. A. C.

1st Punjab States Infy. Bde.

1st Patiala Infy.

1st Kapurthala Infy.

1st Nabha Infy.

1st Jind Infy.

No. I Sec. A. C. Coy.

One Flight R. A. F.

Head of the NORTHLAND column arrives at level crossing (T 02) at 0640 hrs. O. C. NORTHLAND column informed by advanced Guard Comdr. that the advanced Guard is definitely held up near $4\frac{1}{2}$ mile stone East and West of Road by enemy estimated 2 Bns. Infy. one Sqd Cav. supported by a field Bty. North of DURGAPURA (S 9909) on a frontage of approximately 1,000 yards with barbed wire laid out West of ROAD in front of their position. He decides to attack and occupy DURGAPURA with 1st Patiala Infy. and 1st Nabha Infy. Bns: in front supported by 3rd Kashmir Pack Bty. O. C. Patiala Infy. has been allotted objective DURGAPURA.

PROBLEM 1. As O. C. 1st Patiala Infy. what action will you take prior to issue of your verbal orders?

Time —5 Minutes.

Discussion —5 Minutes.

PROBLEM 2. As O. C. 1st Patiala Infy. give your verbal orders for the Attack.

Time —10 Minutes.

Discussion —10 Minutes.

PROBLEM 3. You as a Machine gun Officer have been asked to cover the attack and to protect the left flank. Submit your plan.

Time —8 Minutes.

Discussion—5 Minutes.

SITUATION 1. On arriving here your forward sections are (pointed out) held up by heavy rifle fire from there (point out).

PROBLEM 4. As Platoon Commander of this Platoon what action will you take?

Time —5 Minutes.

Discussion—5 Minutes.

SITUATION 2. On arrival here your left section has been fired on and one *sepoy* killed.

PROBLEM 5. What action will you take as Section Comdr. of that Section?

Time—2 Minutes.

SITUATION 3 On arrival here you receive a message from your No. 5 Platoon Comdr. that his Platoon has been held up by heavy Machine Gun fire from there (Pointed out).

PROBLEM 6. What action will you take as a Coy. Comdr. of that Company.

Time—8 Minutes.

Discussion—5 Minutes.

SITUATION 4. From your Bn. H. Q. as O. C. you have seen with your field glass that owing to the bad leading of the left Coy. Comdr. there (pointed out) became a gap in your forward companies.

PROBLEM 7. What action will you take?

Time—2 Minutes.

Discussion—5 Minutes.

SCHEME CAVALRY IN RECONNAISSANCE

CAVALRY TRAINING VOL. II. CH. 2.

BY

MAJOR BHONSLE

AND

CAPTAIN PARNAIK.

<i>Rendezvous</i>	Reservoir
<i>Time</i>	0730 hrs.
<i>Date</i>	6-12-28.

Reference — Map sheet 259 and 260 Jaipur State.

NARRATIVE—A gold mine has been found on the frontier of the **NORTHLAND** and **SOUTHLAND** States which runs approximately through **KHORA**. L 4809 to East **NINDHAR**, L7508. Both these belligerent States tried to establish their claim to it with the result that they turned against each other.

SITUATION. The **SOUTHLAND** HAVING DEFINITELY learnt all about the mobilization of the **NORTHLAND** Army, sent out a Division which reached Jaipur Station on the 5th Dec. 1928, and are detraining.

The G. O. C. **SOUTHLAND** Forces have detailed an Advanced Guard consisting of the following troops:—

1 Regiment Cavalry.

1st Battalion Indian State Forces.

H. Q. Ind. S. F. Infantry Bde. and Signal section.

2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions Indian State Forces.

1st Field Battery.

1st Field Coy. S. and M.

1st Field Ambulance.

When Cav. Regiment was at Reservoir at 0700 hrs. the G. O. C. Forces informed the O. C. Regiment that he had received a message that enemy was seen bivouacing at 1700

hrs. on the 4th Dec. 1928 at Champanpura, L 4972 and ordered him to send out a squadron on a special mission to find out the strength, disposition and direction of enemy's line of advance.

PROBLEM 1. — Before starting from Reservoir you as a Squadron Comdr. what preliminary measures would you take?

8 Minutes.

PROBLEM 2. — What will be your formation when you march off from here?

PROBLEM 3. -- On coming here you see enemy cavalry moving towards NANGAL at trot in column of Sections along that telegraph post (point out) for two minutes. You as a leading troop comdr. write the message to your squadron comdr, informing him about the Cavalry you have seen.

PROBLEM 4. — When the troop arrives here it is heavily fired upon from those trees (point out). You as a troop comdr. what action will you take and what message will you send to the squadron comdr.?

PROBLEM 5. — Your left pair scouts is surprised from that bush (P.O.) What do they do?

PROBLEM 6. — On receiving R/2 Message from Jem. X you as a Squadron Comdr. what action would you take?

PROBLEM 7. — On coming here you are told by the troop comdr. that enemy strength is one Btn. Infy., one Regiment Cavalry and one Mountain Battery. You have ascertained it by personal reconnaissance also. What message would you send to the Force Commander?

LECTURES

DELIVERED

BY

SENIOR STATE OFFICERS

AT THE

S. O. S

Note :—

As an example, in order to show the worth, quality and standard, some of the lectures delivered at the S. O. S are given here, exactly in the words and views of some of the candidates.

NIGHT OPERATION.

VOLUME II SECTION 30 to 54

F. S. R. SECTION 111 to 119.

BY

(LT.-COLONEL GURDIAL SINGH, PATIALA)

Before considering the carrying out of night operations it will be of value to consider, how the introduction or evolution of various weapons has effected the value of night operation. The increase of air power has made it extremely difficult to move bodies of troops secretly by daylight (either on the battle field or for strategical purposes). So undoubtedly tend to a move liberal use of movement of troops by night where secrecy is of importance. Growth in air power combined with the increased range of artillery to engage targets at greater ranges by the helps of observation post and from the Balloon observation. This advantage to artillery and air power is lost at night. The power of automatic fire weapons and their extended use has rendered the movement of troops over open ground almost impossible till the fire of the weapons has been overwhelmed. One may therefore expect a tendency to use the hours of darkness to cross ground which would otherwise be swept by the fire of automatic weapons. Tanks do not introduce many factors. They are naturally rather blind at all times, but on the other hand darkness aids the tank by protecting it from its foe the Gun. It will thus be seen that the tendency of modern inventions is to render the use of movement by night more common, however carefully treated men do not sleep or rest so well in daylight as by night, and therefore continuous night movement prove in the end a loss in physical fitness and power of action

1. NIGHT OPERATION TAKES TWO FORMS —

- (a) Night movement carried out behind covering troops.
- (b) Night movement unprotected by other troops.

2. NIGHT OPERATION ARE NOW CLASSIFIED —

1. Night march — Is a march made by troops during darkness, more or less in their normal march formation.
2. Night advance — Is a forward movement during darkness made by troops which are deployed.
3. Night attack — Is an assault delivered during darkness or at dawn.
4. Withdrawal — When in close contact with the enemy a withdrawal can most easily be effected at night.

3. OBJECT OF NIGHT MARCHES.

1. Concentration of superior strength at a decisive point.
 2. To transfer bodies of troops from part of Battle field to another.
 3. Withdrawal of troops to avoid decisive engagements, when not in contact with enemy or break off an unsuccessful engagement.
 4. To enable a Commander to make a full use of short hours of daylight in winter, especially in mountain warfare.
 5. To out flank an enemy.
- ## 4. VERY HIGH STANDARD OF TRAINING IS THEREFORE REQUIRED OF TROOPS WHO TAKE PART IN NIGHT OPERATIONS —

1. Improvement of senses *i.e.*,
 - (a) Sight
 - (b) Hearing
 - (c) Human Voice
 - (d) Smell.

(a) SIGHT — Different appearance, distance they can see, visibility different coloured clothes, effect of back ground, appearance of light, bright object in movement.

(b) HEARING — Distance at which noises can be heard. Voice can be heard from long distance, keeping silence.

(c) HUMAN VOICE— On soft ground standing, or lying.

(d) SMELL — Man smoking, bivouac fire, the smell of Gas.

2. Teach men what to expect at night.

3. How to march and conduct themselves.

5. REASON FOR—

1. Avoid observation from air.
2. Effect surprise.
3. Avoid loss of fire.
4. Avoid heat by day.

6. LIMITATION —

1. Difficulty of maintaining direction.
2. Inter-Communication.
3. Slow movement.
4. Difficult and fatiguing.

7. PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED —

1. Secrecy.
2. Reconnaissance.
3. Very careful preparation.
4. Special Training.
5. Orders.

8. PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS —

1. Success in all night operation depends. The most important preliminary to every night operation is thorough reconnaissance of the ground etc., by every means possible both by day and night. This reconnaissance should if possible be carried out by the Officer or Officers responsible for the leading. Notes can be read at night during the movement where the materials are available, these notes should be made in phosphorescent ink or written in very heavy

black ink. The study of aeroplane photographs in connection with the map may help considerably, especially where the ground can not be examined itself.

2. Two kinds reconnaissance —

- (a) For his personal use to lead the column.
- (b) For his Commander, who will issue orders.

3. Map sketch written in black ink.

9. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BEFORE THE NIGHT MARCH IS BEGUN. —

1. The best method of protecting the column.
2. Points where checks are likely to occur.
3. Block branch roads to prevent columns going astray.
4. Compass bearing essential when across country (point where changes direction distance between them.)
5. Prominent land marks measure distances and keep checking them.
6. Two Officers in front guiding column, one with compass two checking distance.
7. It is also advantage if reliable local guide can be procured.
8. Use Star, especially North Star. Star moving East to West. Star moving 1 degree in 4 minutes, you can march on Star up to 15 minutes.

Note.— Have as few changes of direction as possible if necessary post men when change has to be made.

9. Position of assembly must be adequately protected and should be such that the troops can deploy easily in it at right angles to the subsequent line of advance point of assembly marked by the signalling lamps.

10. Have more than one compass so if breaking has to be changed. Compass will be numbered serially. Use same Compass which is used in preliminary reconnaissance.
 11. The hours and periods of halts to be arranged.
 12. Especially where several columns are operating it may be advisable to arrange for distinguishing marks on Uniform or passwords by which friendly bodies may recognise these.
 13. The Commander of the Force and his staff should also wear easily distinguishable badges and also important Officers.
 14. Out post should not be withdrawn till the last possible moment.
 15. Bivouac fires should be left burning and arrangements for keeping them burning.
10. BEFORE THE TROOPS MOVE OFF FROM THEIR ASSEMBLY POSITION THE ORDER SHOULD BE CLEARLY EXPLAINED TO ALL RANKS SO EVERY ONE MAY KNOW.—
1. The object in view and direction of the objective
 2. The formation to be adopted at the forming places.
 3. The part has to play.
 4. His action in case the enemy is not surprised
 5. Orders must be issued. Rifles not loaded. Magazine charged. No fire without fire.
11. PRECAUTION TO BE TAKEN DURING THE MARCH.—
1. The Commander should well move up in the column; and should leave his position, and he should be provided with orderly Officers drawn from the various Units of the Force.
 2. All distance should be reduced close connection being maintained by means of connecting files.

3. The march must be protected by small advance, and Rear Guard in closed Country flanks are best protected by piquets posted by the Advanced Guard withdrawn by the Rear Guard in open flank patrols, but unless accustomed to night work are liable to loss direction.
4. An Officer must march in rear of each Unit.
5. Absolute silence to be maintained.
6. No smoking and lights to be allowed except with the permission of the Commander of the Force.
7. At halts Units must not halt until they have regained any distance they may have lost.
8. During the halts men may lie down, but must not leave the ranks, mounted men retaining hold of their horses.
9. The pace must be uniform. It is not safe to calculate on a force of the side of a division marching on a road faster two miles an hour. In open, pace will be slow.
10. If enemy patrols, Scouts meet advance parties are encountered, they must be captured without noise, rushed in silence with the bayonet without hesitation before they have had an opportunity to give the alarm.
11. Have engineer with advance Guard to clear obstacle. Troops halt lie down if obstacles not easily removed.
12. When troops reach in their forming up places should be allowed to rest a short time before the hour of attack.
13. Troops should lie down at time enemy fires very light or flares.
14. Light signals may be usefull for the attack.

12. NIGHT ADVANCES—

The forward movement of a force already deployed with a view to surprise attack to occupy the ground. When the Night march is a equal to Night march distances between points of assembly forming up places depends on—

1. Nature of Country.
 2. Vigilance of enemy.
 3. Composition of force.
1. Ensure better control.
 2. Better for crossing bad ground.
 3. Loss of vulnerable (weak at some points).
 4. Easy to deploy form.

Small columns distributed in depth more flexible than lines.

Sketch of Night operation.

13. ORDERS FOR NIGHT ADVANCES MUST INCLUDE INFORMATION REGARDING. —

1. Object in view, direction and distance of objective.
2. Formation at forming up places if advance to end in attack.
3. Distinctive marks and password.
4. Wounded prisoners, ammunition, ration.
5. Inter-Communication place of Battalion H. Q. at assembly position during the march, thence and at the forming up place.
6. Procedure if advance discovered and enemy opens fire press forward and close with advance do not hesitate.
7. Role of the reserve held in hand by the Battalion Commander and the employment of M. G. how ground likely to inflade the captured position is to be dealt with.
8. Arrangement for Artillery support.

9. Mounted troops will be naturally of little use during night advance. As in the night advance they should move in the less exposed positions. but if an assault at dawn succeeds they should be ready to push forward with all speed and endeavour to get round the flank of retreating foe. If assault fails the mounted troops will do their utmost to protect the retiring infantry, while the artillery up a rallying position.

14. NIGHT ATTACK. Characteristic—

1. More easily surprise attack.
2. Fire of defence unaimed and enemy fire control and direction almost impossible.
3. Much depth unnecessary owing to possibility of manoeuvring at night.
4. Rally to be made by force larger than brigade if with larger forces, each formation to have own objective and act independently.

FORMING UP PLACE.

Place from where troops form for attack must be easily recognisable.

15. EXPLOITATION OF SUCCESS.

Exploitation of success by night is very difficult and usually be deferred till daylight. Captured ground however should be consolidated. The entrenching of a captured position at night requires careful preliminary arrangements.

- (a) Supply of tools which the troops must often carry themselves.
- (b) For the correct alignment of trenches, which should be checked by compass bearing.

Formation. Very careful organisation to ensure being carried on noiselessly. Column usually deploy into small column *i. e.*, Platoon in section Column. Battalion reserve holds line behind which attacking columns can reorganise if repulsed.

NIGHT WITHDRAWAL.

When in close contact with the enemy a withdrawal cannot most easily be effected at night.

1. Name great difficulty in organising and setting in motion a pursuit.
2. Be uncertain as to the extent of the withdrawal and will have to proceed with caution.

SECRECÝ IS SUPREME IMPORTANCE.

1. Normal activity must be maintained as long as possible. Care must be taken to avoid any marked conflict with the enemy
2. Troops withdrawn definite time programme.
3. Fighting patrols should be sent out at frequent intervals to drive and keep the enemy's patrol at distance.
4. The front line troops should be thinned and gradually withdrawn in small body to the rear by direct routes.
5. A carefully worked out time table is the basis of a well organised withdrawal. Orders for withdrawal written or verbal — from an Officer.

BATTLE OF TELET KABIR.

It is impossible here to give a wide historical review of the subject but some important lessons drawn for examples may be cited with a value. The advance of the British by night to attack the Turkish force at Telet Kabir in 1882 was long night march. The condition in this attack were favourable as the advance was carried out over an open flat plain and parallel to the canal and railway. The advance was led by a naval Officer, who used his knowledge of the Stars to assist him. On the left flank lay a marsh, in which lived large numbers of wild fowl. In order therefore that the noise of disturbed wild fowl should not alarm the enemy. I personally enquired from an old man who was in that Battle. He told that the British general was very clever. He got

this information from Agent that the nearly whole army in batches pray the God before sun rise. So he reached near the position and waited for that time and then he made assault and captured the position with small casualties.

The Night advance against Beersheba, by Lord Allenby's troops in the third attack of GAZA 31st October, 1917, will live in history as one of the most successful night operations carried out on a large scale. The Plan of the Battle demanded that the Turkish Forces should imagine till the last moment, that the main attack was to take place against GAZA twenty five miles further West. Before the Battle two and a half Divisions starting at 1730 hrs. moved forward complete with their Artillery over very rough ground intersected by deep Nallahs. An average distance about 7 miles. the whole of this force was completely and wholly deployed ready for an early morning attack.

On Beersheba from the South by 0400 hrs. At the same time a mounted force of 4 Brigades had moved on the outer flanks of the force and was in position to attack Beersheba from the East at dawn and attacked Gaza. The preparation was for this move had been in hand for some weeks. Every thing possible had been done to deceive the enemy as to the point of attack. At the same time the country had been thoroughly reconnoitred.

LECTURE

The Platoon in Battle

BY

MAJOR BALDEO SINGH PATHANIA, D. M. T.

KASHMIR STATE FORCES.

GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Infantry is the Arm which in the end wins Battles. Infantry the basis of all armies from earliest ages, has in consequence been called the "Queen of Battles". The day of Tank superiority is not yet come. The air independent of land action. Success in Battle cannot be won without fighting. Victory in Battle belongs to the fighting troops to the Platoons. Fighting is a struggle at close quarters. The wisest plans, the most thorough preparations, the most brilliant guidance avail nothing unless the fight is won by fighter—by the platoons.

EXAMPLE.

Battles are won and lost after closing with the enemy. The problem in battle is to get to close quarters with the enemy. To solve this problem we must thoroughly understand the weapons we are armed with and be skilful in their use. All weapons have their characteristic of weapons we decide how best can they be used.

"ROUND BOYS IN SQUARE HOLES EXAMPLE."

All weapons fall into two catagories:—

1. Curved tragectory (Bombs).
2. Flat tragectory (Rifle and L. G.)

Former "Non-killing" but more natural and easy to teach and learn. Only helps in attack. Later "are killing" but being less natural are difficult to teach. No weapon will do everything. so they must be combined intelligently to succeed.

PLATOONS WEAPONS: 1. *Rifle and Bayonet*.—Chief weapon of Infy soldier. It is the possession and use of this weal which makes the man into the soldier *i. e.*, equips him for assaulting and killing the enemy. A well trained soldier using the rifle can fire single shots or rapid fire upto about 15 rds. a minute. A man with a rifle and bayonet can deal equally well with an enemy at any range from 2 ft. to 600 yards. Beyond this range several rifles must be combined in order to get good fire effect.

Using either the bullet or the bayonet a trained soldier can deal with an enemy in all circumstances except when behind bullet proof cover. Generally speaking a man can carry sufficient ammunition for a day's fighting. Is not liable to stoppages.

Battle can only be won in the last resort by bullet and bayonet. The first requirement in a soldier therefore is confidence in the rifle and bayonet, based on his own skill to use it. Bullet will drive the enemy to cover but cannot drive out of it. The bullet covers the advance of the bayonet and the bayonet completes the work (the destruction of the enemy). Confidence in the ability to kill with bayonet carries the man to assault. Confidence in their ability to kill with bullet steadies him to beat off a counter attack.

2. *Lewis Gun*. An automatic rifle, produces mechanically a very rapid rate of fire with great accuracy and like the rifle can deal with any enemy who is not behind the bullet proof cover. Increased volume of fire enables to cover wider front, close grouping, necessity of good fire order, hit or miss weapons; target should be deep and not shallow—for fair turn of bullets—on account of long and narrow B. Z. Frontal fire seldom pays. Flanking fire pays well; surprise fire pays best. Its fire effect is roughly equal to 25 rifles. It requires 2 men to use it in action. Volume switched in any direction rapidly; economy of personnel; useful in defence and consolidation. It is not an assaulting weapon. Firing from hip; it uses up ammunition necessitates fire control. One accurate bullet better than 20 inaccurate ones; short well aimed bursts are most effective; suitable targets: liable to stoppages.

3. *Rifle Grenade.* has a range of 210 Yards. Fires a Grenade with good killing power. Useful, for turning enemy out of cover so that he can be killed in the open. It helps in assault but is not an assaulting weapon.

4. *Hand Grenade.* Has a limited range of about 30-40 yards. Its wounding circle is greater than its range so must not be thrown in the open. It is not an assaulting weapon but most useful for "mopping up".

The Grenade is an auxiliary weapon to the bullet and bayonet and it should never be used when it is possible to employ either of the other weapons effectively.

5. *Human Factor.* The chief weapon is the man himself with his mind trained to act quickly and accurately and his body capable of carrying and making use of the material weapons provided for him. His whole body must be imbued with the "will to victory" and his body able to carry out the wishes of his mind otherwise it is no use providing him with weapons however powerful and deadly.

"The moral is to the physical as three to one" Napoleon. Has lost none of its truth though being backneyed and doubtedly the "Will to victory" in the minds of the personnel of an Army from the private to the C-in-C is the first necessity for success in War. It cannot exist in fullness unless there is a feeling of confidence in himself, "his weapon", his Unit, his leaders and the justice of his cause.

6. An indispensable auxiliary is the platoon Commander. The success of the platoon is dependent on the Platoon Commander and its fortune lies in his head.

"The platoon Commander came to his own in the great War". On the vast Battle fronts, in France and Belgium, the leader of the small, self contained fighting Unit was proved to be the indispensable factor in victory."

The relations of the platoon Commander to his men has parallel in other spheres in which one man is set in authority, over another. He accepts greater personal responsibility. He is the leader of his men in the fight; their trainer for the fight and the keeper of their welfare at all times. The platoon reflects the leader. A good platoon is a platoon well commanded and gallantly led.

Leadership is not born of learning. It depends on simple and straight forward human qualities. A leader must have confidence of his men — capture their minds. Confidence by commanding their respect — respect for clearness and simplicity of orders, firm way in which he insists on their being carried out. sense of justice, his common sense, keenness, energy and habit of forethought, indifference to personal danger; readiness and sharing men's hardships; his obstinate humour in face of difficulties, for the obvious pride he takes in his command.

The platoon Commander who wins his men's confidence has won more than half his war. He has an instrument in his hand capable of high achievement. The spirit with which he is able to fire it, will carry it to success through the hardest fighting. Whatever demands he makes on it, will be cheerfully met, where he goes, his men will follow him.

EXAMPLE (Duke of Wellington).

The final test of a Platoon, a Coy. is its fighting spirit. The battle is only won when the enemy's forces are destroyed. When his troops are killed or captured the main task of every platoon is to kill or capture the enemy confronting it. This is the simple rule of War. Skill in the performance of this task with the smallest loss to the platoon is developed by training.

Fighting spirit, discipline, *Espint-de-corps*, Physical fitness. The platoon Commander cannot in action command every individual man in his platoon nor must he try to attempt to do so when training it. *The Axiom of Organisation* is that "one man can control directly and efficiently four or five subordinates".

STRENGTH OF THE CHAIN LIES IN ITS WEAKEST LINK.—

If a Commander attempts to control personally the action of more than five subordinates the efficiency of organisation what it is, suffers. Sec. = 5 men and all N. Co = making allowance for casualties, leave special employment = 7 men. Selection of N. Cos.

Fighting Spirit. But training is valueless if the fighting Spirit—the will to advance at any cost in order to close with the enemy and kill him—be absent.

OFFENSIVE ACTION—PRINCIPAL OF WAR — A boxer content only to spar will lose his match and lose it painfully. Troops thrust into battle without resolve to fight, to win, and to win by fighting will lose with heavy loss.

The fighting spirit of the platoon is derived from its Commander. In Commander it springs from his own resolute belief, in himself, in his weapon, in the supreme necessity for winning the War and in his country ability to win it.

RESULT — Fire direction, Fire control, and Fire discipline,

ARMAMENT — Of Platoon suitable for all situations in all kinds of Warfare particularly open warfare (open flanks, war of movement and ground not specially prepared). Other means which help us to solve the problem of closing with the enemy is "application of the principles of Infy. action".

PRINCIPLES OF INFY. ACTION. 1. *Reconnaissance*:— Obtain information about ground, enemy and our own troops. Carried out by looking or fighting we may have to fight before we can look.

2. *Surprise* "Mistify, mislead and surprise the enemy in every possible way" Stonewall Jackson. Attack an enemy where and when he least expects it. It is the potent factor in war. Obtained by secrecy as to the point of attack and rapidity of movement.

3. *Economy of Forces* — As far as the Platoon is concerned is obtained by making best use of weapon, ground and formations to help us forward and save casualties, also by not using 3 secs where 2 secs would suffice.

4. *Fire and movement*—means the correct application of fire and movement. 1st. Inf. Characteristic:—power to manœuvre over almost any ground though at a low speed, can go both by day and by night almost every where he can place a foot—“mechanical transportation.”

2nd Inf Characteristic — Power to produce great volumes of S. A. fire quickly in any direction (close with enemy) Neither fire nor movement is of much value separately. The coordination of these two characteristics forms the doctrine of “fire and movement” which is the basis of all Infy organisation and action.

“*Fire Movement is the bedrock on which Infy tactics are based.*” Movement in battle within range of the enemy’s fire will be guided by the nature of the ground over which the fighting takes place.

Intelligent user of ground is essential for the success of the Infy task which is destruction at close quarters of the enemies Infy with minimum loss to itself.

(a) By concealment of movement.

(b) By rapidity of movement.

Platoon Commander should have an “eye for ground” smell folds. Throughout the fight should watch for—

1. Concealed line of approach allow to gain ground towards enemy without loss or to surprise enemy.
2. Ground open to hostile fire. (rushes or bounds).
3. Ground giving a good view of enemy, (cover advance),
4. Ground concealed from enemy (counter attack).

There is no mystery in the use of ground, the principle of attacking is as old as the beasts of prey.

5. *Co-operation.*—Ensured by :

- (1) Issuing clear orders.
- (2) Being sure that every one understands the plan.
- (3) Having good inter communication.

6. *Exploitation of Success.* Take full advantage of success pursue the beaten enemy and give him no rest employ “soft-spot” tactics.

PHASES OF BATTLE.

1. Approach March.
2. Gaining contact.
3. Attack and assault.
4. Consolidation and exploitation of success.
5. Defence.

ATTACK.—

The formations the Units advances in should

1. Present narrow and shallow targets to hostile fire.
2. Facilitate control of sections by Commanders, so that these can be readily moved in any direction which the ground within the sector dictates.
3. Admits of rapid deployment for fire or for assault.
4. Admits of front of attack being covered when required by maximum of fire with minimum of men (L. Gs. Fire).
5. Cause the least fatigue to the men advancing. They must be brought to the assault as fresh as possible. Therefore the approach formation which is the least fatiguing and the easiest to control should be preserved until hostile fire compels the adoption of scattered formations. As soon as hostile fire permits, troops should close again into columns.

EXAMPLE—ONLY AN ILLUSTRATION.—

Artillery shells. Column of Platoon in four. M. G. and Artillery fire-Group of Section: Scouts ahead to locate infy. by drawing fire leading Platoons in contact with enemy. Advance continued to assaulting distance. Sections deployed to deliver assault and capture objective. Platoons organised and continue advance to next objective or other Units pass through them for this purpose. A Platoon should be given a definite objective.

PLATOON COMMANDERS TACTICS—

1. Personal reconnaissance before movement.
 - (a) When troops in close contact with enemy.

- (b) When not in contact with enemy; enemy dispositions uncertain. Artillery co-operation difficult.
- 2. Platoon must push on to objective with the resolve to get in with bayonet as soon as possible.
- 3. Artillery Barrage: follow it. It is better to risk few casualties from the Artillery than from enemy.
- 4. Tank Co-operation—Quick movement.
- 5. If checked—covering fire from L. G. or other sec.—work round a flank.
- 6. Watch events on flanks, touch with flank Units — Mutual Co-operation.
- 7. Surest method of helping a neighbour is to push forward vigorously.

PLATOON COMMANDER. —

- 1. Instructions to sec-Commanders; simple and definite; one sec. in hand, ensure every one knows his job-equipment.
- 2. Direction vital; Compass bearing, Landmarks, essential to start square to objective—loss of direction—failure.
- 3. Assembly.
- 4. Liaison with flanks, watch flanks, train observers.
- 5. Reports about situation; negative information.
- 6. Anti-air-craft.
- 7. Mopping up—whole objective searched and cleared of enemy.
- 8. Protection.
- 9. Re-organisation and consolidation.
- 10. Exploitation.

DEFENCE.—

- 1. Protection against surprise.
- 2. Organisation in depth and active resistance by defenders.

3. Cover defended ground by fire not with men, with posts and not with lines.
 - (a) Occupy tactical points.
 - (b) Ensure mutual support by fire.
 - (c) Conceal defences from Artillery fire.
 - (d) Make fire positions.
4. Organisation of defensive positions.
5. Offensive is the soul of successful defence. Passive resistance — resistance by fire alone — may check but cannot defeat enemy. Every Commander must be prepared to pass on to the attack if the enemy succeeds in penetrating position. Reserve can march for counter attack essential and a definite plans for its use. Vigorous and immediate counter attack by local reserve will eject the enemy from our position or bring to stand still until larger Units complete his defeat. Local counter-attack must be immediate and launched by the Commander on the spot without awaiting orders (against enemy before he has time to reorganise.) It must therefore be reconnoitred, planned and rehearsed (over the actual ground) so that all ranks know their duties.

OUT POST.—

Forward Platoon and Support Platoons.

REAR GUARD.—

Withdrawal tests—discipline and hardship demand a high standard of both.

3. His final goal must be honest service of his fellow creatures.
4. Must nullify his own interests.
5. Must hold uppermost the sacred idea in his mind that he is to live for other people.
6. Must own a thorough knowledge of all the ins and outs of his pursuit.
7. Must fully understand the likely results of all his undertakings.
8. Must have sufficient insight into the temperament of the group of men he is going to guide.
9. Must have a full view of all the likely loopholes in his enterprise and must account for them.
10. Should always be prepared to guard against any counter attack.
11. Must possess a thorough knowledge of human nature.
12. Must have a balanced mind, dauntless and inspiring in times of peril and solemnly calm in moments of victory.
13. Must have an amiable personality and loved by his subordinates.
14. Must create confidence in the hearts of all those who are to carry out his biddings.
15. Should impress upon the minds of all under him that he values their lives much more than of his own.
16. Must be a good speaker to infuse zeal in his subordinates.

By the above mentioned qualities of a Leader; I do not mean that every Leader must possess all these and to full extent. but the possessor of more qualities and to more extent is a better Leader than the others.

A leader is always the soul of the entire march. It rests with him to create an iron will in the hearts of the Rank and File. Khalid-Ben Waleed. the celebrated Leader of

Remember, the commander is the mirror of his men, and when true sympathy exists, they will show the same impulse as their leader.

By the word "Leader" I do not only mean a commander of a Division or a Brigade, but a commander of a body of two men has equal right to be called a Leader of those two men and therefore should prove himself a Leader. A leader may be big or small, but the principles of Leadership remain the same.

Gentleman, you must have understood my ideas, which with great effort, I have tried to explain such a vast subject in these very few lines.

Fortunately, the audience of my lecture are Leaders themselves. Leaders from many years.

So I do not think it is necessary to go into more details.

Before reaching to conclusion, I must appreciate the training of our course, the lessons of which have very much helped us in making a good leader and in addition to those, my above said few lines may help you in the success of your future "Leadership".

LECTURE.

RECONNAISSANCE AND OCCUPATION OF BATTERY POSITIONS.

BY

CAPTAIN DHERAK RAM, KASHMIR.

Gentlemen, you all know how a regiment of cavalry or a battalion of infantry reconnoitre and take positions in the different phases of battle and in what formations they move after their commanders have received orders or instructions from the superior commander. In all the schemes and demonstrations that you have had here great stress has been laid on this.

This day I will tell you something about the reconnaissance and occupation of Battery Positions in the Field.

Some knowledge of this sort is essential for all the senior officers for there will be every opportunity to have to command a mixed force in the field; for at a critical moment when speed in coming to action and opening fire is essential for artillery much time can be saved if infantry or cavalry commanders can point out to the artillery officer placed under their command suitable ground for Observation Posts and Battery Positions by their knowledge of the ground in which they have been already manoeuvring, and know particularly well.

Before I go on with the main subject I would like to tell you something about the organisation of the Battery. For purposes of manoeuvre a Battery is divided into:—

- (a) Battery Staff.
- (b) Firing Battery.
- (c) First Line.

(a) Battery Staff consists of the Battery Commander (B. C.), Captain, Gun Position Officer (G. P. O.), B. S. M., B. Q. M. S., signallers and others. It is divided into Battery Commander's (B. C.'s) party, Captain's party, and A and B signal groups.

B. C.'s party is composed of B. C. who is the senior most officer in the Battery, Gun position officer, who is the senior

subaltern officer of the battery, N.C.O. i/c signallers, B.C.A., G.P.O.A., range taker and 3 horse holders.

Captains party consists of the Captain, who is 2nd in command and supervises the supply of ammunition etc. and choosing sites for the wagon line etc. the Q.M.S., and the farrier.

A and B signal groups each consists of four signallers and two horse holders one of the groups is employed for maintaining communications between the O.P. and the battery position while the other is kept in reserve at the wagon line and is available should a second O.P. be required or it may be employed with a detached section or in case of a hurried retreat or advance.

(b) Firing battery consist of the actual guns and some fixed allotment of ammunition.

In horse drawn artillery it consists of guns and one ammunition wagon per subsection.

In mechanically drawn artillery it consists of certain specified number of lorries for each gun.

In Mountain Artillery it consists of mules for carrying the various portions of the guns on carriages, three ammunition mules per subsection, one pioneer mule per section and two or three relief mules per gun.

When he receives his orders may be with battery or forward with the infantry or brigade commander.

Having received his orders he must first briefly appreciate the situation himself, he must first make up in his mind how far the battery will have to go before it comes into action. He must also decide whether he should go there direct for reconnaissance and order the battery to a rendezvous near about or take it along with him. Also as regards his staff.

If a long advance has to be made, the country is intricate or he is ahead of the battery, the rendezvous will always be used, and the staff ordered to a locality where it should join the B.C.

Having made up his mind he issues orders to the battery.

If with the battery he himself gives orders to the

battery, but if ahead sends these in writing to the G. P. O. giving. —

1. Brief tactical situation.
2. Orders for the G. P. O. and B. C.'s party to join him immediately stating the place where they should join him.
3. Orders for the battery leader as to leading the battery to a rendezvous stating the location, the route and the pace to be maintained or orders to lead the battery forward keeping in touch with him.
4. Probable location of battery position.
5. Orders to Captain to dump ammunition if necessary and the position of Brigade ammunition column, Divisional column, or ammunition refilling point.
6. Probable location of Brigade head-quarters etc. and any other formations on the flank etc.

Having given these instructions the Battery Commander rides ahead with the G. P. O. who comes forward to meet him according to the instructions given him, for his reconnaissance. The B. C. staff meanwhile keeps a reasonable distance behind and advances under cover. The B. C. and G. P. O. will have a full reconnaissance of the country for the best sites for the Battery position and observation post. As a rule they will reconnoitre the observation post first as the Battery position depends on the facilities for observation.

The most important consideration for O. P. is that it should overlook the ground within the zone allotted to the Battery, from which fire can be directed, observed and corrected. If the time permits another officer may be sent for and a forward observation post established. It may be in some cases to a flank or rear. It is of help for better observation and can also be utilised when the first is discovered, blinded etc. The exact site for Battery position is selected by the G. P. O. The O. P. having been selected the B. C. will tell G. P. O. where the Battery position should approximately be. He gives him a definite line on which lay out the line of fire, the front to be covered, ammunition

and any other instruction regarding crest, clearance, etc. including the minimum range which may have to be fired.

He also gives instructions to the N. C. O. i/c Signallers as regards the means of communications. He then with his assistant and rangefinder goes to the O. P. to watch the tactical situation. It is of utmost importance that he and his party, small though it is, should keep absolutely behind cover and avoid all crests etc.

The exact gun position is selected and marked by the G. P. O. The 1st essential of a Battery position is that it should allow a battery effectually to carry out the task allotted to it without having to shift position, and also engage any other likely targets that may appear not only on its own zone but any where provided they are not already engaged by any other battery.

The G. P. O. when selecting the exact site for guns should bear in mind the following:—

1. Cover from ground and air observation. The position should be under cover as far as possible. Natural cover should be utilised whenever possible. Shadows cast by buildings, hedges and trees afford effective concealment. Advantage should also be taken of banks, fences, edges of woods, small hill features or other formations of the ground. Batteries disposed in woods or amongst trees or buildings are practically difficult to locate from air. When no cover is available irregular formations should be adopted as far as practicable, since straight lines and right angles attract notice. Villages and other defiles should be avoided owing their liability to bombardment by hostile Artillery and aircraft.
2. Crest clearance G. P. O. is responsible that as much ground as possible in the zone allotted to the battery can be engaged without risk of hitting any intervening crest or obstacle doing harm to own troops. For this he should compare the crest angle to the obstacle plus something for safe clearance to the quadrant elevation to

the target with the minimum charge possible. For safe clearance the quadrant elevation should be the greater. Howitzers with higher trajectory can clear the crests much more easily than the guns with flat trajectory.

3. Exits. The position should be such as can be cleared readily and easily in case of necessity. If country is close, alternative exits from all battery positions will have to be cleared.

4. Covered approaches for ammunition supply. The guns carry a very little supply of ammunition with them at the actual positions, so they have to be fed from behind. For this there should be good covered approaches to the position from behind. If there are no covered approach the enemy will at once discover the position on account of movement.

5. Good platforms. The ground where the guns are brought into action should be fairly level so that the guns may not be tilted and shots may be accurate.

For defence an alternative battery position should be chosen at the earliest possible moment, so that there may be no great delay in occupying the position and opening fire when the first position has to be evacuated. Further in a battery there are two Lewis guns. G. P. O. is responsible for choosing suitable positions for L. A. for flank protection. If possible he should arrange for obstacles to be thrown before them.

When the battery position has been selected it will be either 'open', 'covered' or 'semi-covered' according to the nature of the cover available. 'Covered' positions are the best but in some cases 'semi-cover' or even 'open' positions will have to be occupied.

An 'open' position is one in which guns can be seen from ground in occupation of the enemy.

A 'semi-covered' position is one in which the guns are invisible from any ground in occupation of the enemy but the amount of cover obtained is insufficient to conceal the

flash of the guns or the smoke and dust raised by them after fire has been opened.

A 'covered' position is one in which the guns and flashes are completely concealed from any ground in occupation of the enemy.

As regards communications between O. P. and Battery position the methods employed are line telephony using voice or buzzer and visual signalling. It may be possible in some cases to communicate directly by voice when the two are within speaking distance of each other. Generally voice telephony is the most effective and rapid means of communication but it demands a high standard of training. The normal methods employed are day light signalling lamp and flag.

With telephone buzzer and lamp Morse code is used; with flags either Morse or Semaphore, the last for only short distances. In all cases except voice telephony the transmission of orders should be carried out by the Artillery code by which method orders are transmitted in small group of two or three letters. For this practice is essential.

All signallers to be trained in transmission of orders by code, including the operation of en-coding and de-coding.

The G. P. O. having selected the exact gun position will send B. S. M.

1. To give instructions to the battery leader at the rendezvous or on the march if a rendezvous is not being used.
2. To bring up the signal group if not already up.

The Instructions to the Battery leader will include —

- (a) Location of Battery position.
- (b) Nature of the position, whether covered, semi-covered or open.
- (c) Method of occupation.
- (d) Any further details which may be necessary.

On completion of this task the B. S. M. return to the Battery position.

The Gun position Officer will then with the aid of his Assistant choose his Command post, lay out the line of

fire as directed, mark the gun position and select site for Lewis Guns.

The Command post is the place from where the G. P. O. passes orders to and supervises the action of the guns. Its normal position is on the windward flank and slightly in rear of the guns.

The N. C. O. *i/c.* of signallers will reconnoitre the signal route, decide how signals are to be organised and maintained, and as soon as the Signallers arrive, open communications between the O. P. and Battery.

In the meantime, while reconnaissance is being carried out the Battery leader will move the battery in conformity with the initial orders received.

Now good Battery leading aims at adopting such formations and making such use of the ground as will enable the position to be occupied smoothly and rapidly without unnecessary exposure to hostile fire and observation and without undue strain on men or animals.

In order that best route may be followed and the most suitable formation adopted the battery leader must have a good eye for the country and a thorough knowledge of map reading. As far as possible best use should be made on covered approaches. Crest lines should be avoided as far as possible. Swept Zones should be crossed at an increased pace and in such formation as appear most likely to avoid casualties.

Now there are four formations in which a battery generally manoeuvre. —

First is the Column of route.—In this each sub-section moves complete behind the other with its first line. It is generally used on road when long marches have to be made but is unsuitable for manoeuvres across country owing to the length of the column (450 Yds.) and lack of control.

Second is the Battery column.—In this the firing batteries of each section follows behind that of the other. Length of column about 60 Yds. It is the normal formation in which a battery generally advances on the

field of operations. It is suitable for crossing open country. It is a compact and flexible formation from which line can be formed in any direction quite easily and rapidly.

Third is the line formation. It is rather unwieldy and exhausting. It is unsuitable except for direct advances or retirements and that only for a short distance. Mostly used for short advances into action.

Fourth is the column of sub-sections. In this the firing Battery of one sub-section follows behind that of the other. Length of column about one hundred Yds. Usually employed for taking ground to a flank when some suitable cover such as a bank, line of hedges or nullah is available. It is particularly suitable for occupying position by the flank method and semi-covered positions.

There are three ways in which a sub-section of Mountain Artillery manoeuvres. The formation adopted should be that which is most likely to deceive the observer and minimise casualties.

- (a) ORDER OF MARCH. In this all the mules of the sub-section march one behind the other in single file. This is used when there is cover most from the ground and the air. It should be adhered to as long as possible.
- (b) THE CLOSE ORDER. In this the mules of the sub-section are formed in three ranks of three or four mules each one behind the other and closed up. This is useful in fire swept and broken grounds. The depressions or dead ground can be covered at normal pace while the crest or fire swept areas should be covered at a faster pace.
- (c) OPEN ORDER. In this too the sub-section is again divided into three groups of three or four mules each but in this case the groups are distributed in depth at about 20 yards distance and the rear groups incline outwards so as to divide the gun intervals equally which can be increased or decreased according to the situation. This formation is used when advancing in open country which is liable to hostile shelling or bombing from the air.

So much for formations and their employment. The battery leader must ride well ahead of the battery but must ensure that his signals are clearly seen, that he can contrall its movements. Timely reconnaissance of difficult country is essential. Whether the battery commander decides to ride forward himself beyond signal control of the battery or to send some one else will depend upon the tactical situation. In the former alternative the next senior will act as leader. Ground Scouts may be used to assist and keep touch with the battery.

On approaching the position battery leader rides ahead at an increased pace. He finds from the B. S. M. the exact position, sees how it is marked and the G. P. O. wants it to be occupied, and then rides back to the battery having made up his mind how he will manoeuvre it to bring it into action.

Now there are three methods by which a battery position can be occupied. They differ and vary according to the nature of the ground and the facilities for any cover etc.

First is the FLANK METHOD. In this the G. P. O. marks the position of the flank guns by himself and his assistant or by two small flags. The Battery leader having seen the position and the markers forms Column of subsections in sufficient time to allow the guns to close up to their correct distances before the actual position is reached, and then wheel inwards from one of the flanks. As soon as the guns reach their respective positions they are brought into action by the battery leader by ordering 'action right' or 'action left.'

This method is used for occupying 'covered' or 'semi-covered' positions. The advantages of this method are —

1. Full advantage can be taken of hedges or other cover and the contours of the ground to conceal the battery coming into action.
2. A minimum of space is required for manoeuvre.
3. All guns are on the correct alignment and no teams need advance in front of the actual line of the guns.

Second is the INDEPENDENT METHOD. In this the G. P. O. selects a preliminary position under cover and as close as

possible to the gun position. The battery is brought up and halted there by the battery leader. The section commanders and Nos. 1 fall out and mark the positions for their guns as pointed out by G. P. O. and go back to the battery reconnoitering the route to be followed by their guns when advancing for action. The advantage of this method is that it admits of thorough reconnaissance in the selection and occupation of gun positions and route to them. It is of special value when operating in broken, heavy or very enclosed country or where special precautions have to be taken to avoid observation from the air, or where manoeuvring in close formation is difficult.

Third is the LINE METHOD. In this the position is marked by the Battery Commander himself and the G. P. O. or by two markers, the front in the centre of the actual gun position, the other some fifty yards behind it. When reaching the rear marker the battery is brought into line with correct intervals. Nos. 1 fall out and select their actual gun position at correct intervals and in line with the front marker. Battery advances and is brought into action by the order of the G. P. O.

This method is the quickest and most direct method of coming into action but is only suitable for use in open country where the ground admits of free manoeuvre. 'Covered' may but 'open' must be occupied by this method. It is unsuitable for the occupation of 'semi-covered' positions where there is any risk of the teams being exposed as the battery comes into action.

As the battery comes into action the mules and wagons move off to the rear independently as each is unloaded or unhooked. Battery Sergeant Major collects and guides them to the Wagon line which has been reconnoitered and selected by the Captain.

As soon as the battery has come into action its position and the position of the O. P. will be reported to the Brigade Headquarters.

After orders have been received from the Battery Commander to come into action, the Captain separates the first line from the firing battery and orders the farrier to bring it along behind, usually at the convenient distance of half a mile. He himself with B. Q. M. H. keeps in touch with B. C.'s party. When the exact positions for the O. P. and

the Battery have been chosen he will reconnoitre and select position for the first line and firing battery mules. They should be to a flank and to the rear. In selecting these positions he should take into consideration cover and protection against observation from the air as well as exits from the position selected. For this existing cover such as trees, sides of hedges or any other cover will be utilised to the fullest extent, but then the sections or sub-sections should be distributed in such a way as will allow the quickest way of evacuation. They should not be mixed up together.

If however no cover from observation from the air is available, the teams should be formed up at full interval facing the front. When there is danger of attack from the air they will at once open out as in open order double or treble interval.

Having selected the positions for first line and firing battery mules, he will also select alternative positions of assembly for advance or retirement and communicate these to all concerned.

He establishes communications between the first line and battery and makes plans for the replenishment of ammunition. For this he must know what ammunition is being fired at the battery and send it up accordingly. He must keep himself informed of the tactical situation, as in case of casualty to the Battery Commander he will have to take his place, being the 2nd in Command.

This is how a battery first comes into action. It may not however be possible for a battery to keep to one position for long. It may be required to change its position to the front, flank or rear in accordance with the tactical situation, that is to say, to support an attack, to cover the withdrawal of other troops, to obtain increased fire effect, or to evacuate a position located by the enemy.

The procedure will be the same in all cases with the exception that in a retirement to cover the withdrawal of other troops certain modifications are necessary.

When a position has to be changed for advance—

I. Battery Commander sends the order 'prepare to move' to the Gun Position Officer and gives him instruction on the following—

(a. Brief tactical situation and the urgency of the move.

- (b) Place at which B. C.'s party is to assemble and order for the signal group.
- (c) Battery rendezvous if required, its location and route.
- (d) Probable location of the new position.

Gives orders for the closing down of communications.

2. The G. P. O.—He gives the order 'prepare to move' to the.....At this ammunition and stores are repacked and all possible preparations made for limbering up. The guns however remain in action till the last moment. He informs Captain and Battery leader of the orders he has received. He then collects the B. C. party and signallers as ordered and goes to meet the Battery Commander.

3. The Captain on receiving the orders sends up the firing mules to the battery position and orders the first line to follow behind under the farrier or otherwise. If a rendezvous is used he will supervise the evacuation of the old position, but otherwise he will ride ahead and keep touch with the G. P. O. so as to arrange for the reconnaissance of the new wagon line.

4. The Battery leader informs section commanders of the situation and the procedure to be followed, and as soon as the battery is formed up leads it into the required direction.

In case of retirement the following is the difference in procedure:—

The Battery Commander joins and remains with the battery until it is clear of the position and out of immediate danger. He therefore sends the Captain and the G. P. O. to select the new Battery position and O. P. He fixes a rendezvous and route to it along which the battery will retire so that they may know where to send information. The G. P. O. takes with him his assistant, spare signal group, N. C. O. i/c signallers, and such of B. C. party as can be spared and also the B. S. M. who is to meet and guide the battery.

The Captain prior to his departure for reconnaissance issues orders for the movement of first line so that they may retire in time.

The rest of the procedure for retirement is the same as for advance.

Retirements should always be commenced at a walk and conducted in an orderly manner. There should be no undue hurry as it leads to confusion and disorder.

This is briefly the story of Batteries coming into and getting out of action. From what I said you must have noticed how very essential it is for all the Officers and N. C. O.'s to be trained in their respective jobs. Most attention should therefore be paid to their training.

AN EASY WAY TO WIN WAR

BY

CAPTAIN SYED NAZEER ALI, BAHAWALPUR.

Gentlemen, from the title of my lecture you might be anticipating something very uncommon to be revealed to you. I wish I could tell you something very interesting, concerning an easy way to win a War; but, Gentlemen, you must excuse me if it does not come upto expectation.

My lecture runs under the four main headings:—

1. War a necessity.
2. Prepare for War and there will be no War.
3. Thorough training of all ranks is Preparation.
4. Training is thorough when it is acquired and imparted with a common sense method.

Now let us see how far the above 4 headings are reasonable?

Before I should give an explanation for my reasons, I think you all agree as to the possibility of a War.

Here I have got a few quotations and just see, what do the best brains, the prominent people think and say about War.

Town Topics in its edition of the 29-11-26 writes:—

1. War is the natural state of nations.

Again the same paper remarks somewhere else:—

2. Peace is only the interval of rest and preparation between Wars.
3. Count Moltke, German Minister of War, who died in 1891, says, "Perpetual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. War is an element in the Order of the World ordained by God."

4. British Priemeer Mr. Gladston says, "Without War the World would stagnate and will lose itself in materialism."

5. Finally see how clearly a German Philosopher, Nietzhe expresses himself about War. "It is a mere illusion"

and petty sentiments to expect any thing at all if the World forgets how to make War."

Still there are some people, who think there will be no war. Of course it is pretty good idea, but as for myself I do not agree. I say there were wars, there are wars, and there will be wars. A war is inevitable. League or no league, disarmament or no disarmament, you cannot get out of them. Men like Moses, David, Ram Chandar, and Mohamad, although they were messengers of peace could not avoid them. Similarly as a matter of fact, anyhow or other, we too have to deal with our own wars. And remember we have not to fight them only, we have to win them also. If such is the case, as I say, why not prepare? Of course we must.

We know that in order to get a thing done one requires to be ready well beforehand. So in the same way we too are required to be ready for the war, when there is no war. Certainly peace is the best time for us to win a war. It is fatal to sit and wait. Preparation for war is our first and foremost a necessity, a responsibility and a duty. Of course it is, and every body knows it, but then how to prepare?

Gentlemen, you know, a rifle is considered to be good rifle when its component parts, the sight, the action, the bore, down to the very pins and screws on it are quite intact and properly manufactured. And you know what are usually the results of such a rifle on the shooting range.

Most probably the results are expected to be good. But when the results are not good, we come to conclusion, perhaps, the man, who is handling the rifle is himself a third class shot. Well then who is to be blamed?

Since the fault is of the man it is quite logical that the man is to be blamed and not the rifle. But if the man turns out to be a marksman, and not a third class shot, as we presumed, then, of course, in this case, we may attribute the bad results to unfavourable weather conditions, say, bad light, strong wind, or perhaps the results are bad, because the ammunition is defective.

Now let us just think over this whole thing and discuss it over another way. You see:—

1. Results are bad when the rifle is bad.

2. The rifle is bad because its component parts do not work well.
3. In spite of a rifle being accurate, a man who does not fire quite in observance of the rules of Musketry, very likely he fails.

Now for instance, suppose: --

1. Your rifle is the force you are using against your enemy.
2. Yourself the force commander.
3. Weather unfavourable conditions as heavy rains, snow storms or poor supplies as regard ration, ammunition and equipment.

Now if you are a good force commander with a well trained force under you, and weather condition is also favourable. I think there is every hope that you win.

But mind, if any of the part of your rifle, say the sight or speaking about your force, your signallers or gunners or perhaps even the followers only do not perform their respective jobs efficiently, then of course it is quite obvious, that success in the field for you is very very doubtful. And if yourself are incapable, your decisions are faulty, your application of the principles of war is not exact and sound, then of course, you have rare chance to hit the target with an inclined sight, merely, because, you have not kept your eye on the ball.

The long and short of all I said so far, is to drive home that a thorough training of all ranks is an important point which we must never forget.

We must pay every attention, in the training of our backward men. Since a chain is tested by the weakest link, so we must not let a weak link remain in the chain of our command. For you know, very often a force is made to pay in hard cash and suffers a lot simply for the negligence of one man, say a sentry in a piquet or an orderly with a verbal message.

So if we really wish that we should win our wars, then we ought to be prepared before the war actually comes on. Our preparations for the war must be thorough in all

details and should be efficient in the profession of arms. Make hay while the sun shines. Your peace time manoeuvres must be carried out with a view to all the likelihoods that are apt to occur actually under service conditions.

During their training and manoeuvres, no doubt, almost all the junior Leaders and N. C. O. instruct their men, not to expose their positions unnecessarily, but how often is it that a majority of these Leaders do observe this rule? Very often the junior Leaders and N. C. Os stand up quite a clear target and expose their positions. Of course they do so, because they know there is no probability of being hit, and whenever questioned they produce an excuse very universal that in order to study the ground in front, for their next bound they have been forced to do so, but, is such an action practicable, while operating against an enemy?

Certainly in an operation we shall have very little chance to continue these wrong methods acquired into a habit during peace time. We shall not be able to lead our men properly during an operation simply because we have not been properly trained to make our observations from behind the covers. So, you see, we fail if we are not properly trained.

But how to acquire this proper and thorough training?

A proper training to which I have alluded so often can only be acquired by our becoming careful and attentive to what we are taught. As for my personal experience. I know that inspite of lectures, demonstrations and manoeuvres, most of the new men, in my Battalion, for quite a long time could not perfectly understand what a piquet, an advance guard or convoy was. But the very tactical formations, the use of cover, the covering fire, Advance Guard and Piquets, those sounded to be dull and wearisome almost to all the new men, while doing manoeuvres, in the vicinity of their peace station turned up quite full of vigour and actuality no sooner they were on the frontier. Why? Because every one of us grew a bit careful and attentive towards his responsibilities, simply because we knew negligence here on the Frontier is punished with an enemy bullet and not with mere threats of extra Parades.

It does not mean, that we should start shooting our men for their errors. It simply means that our method of training must have some such organisation, that men should take interest in the work allotted to them.

Here in this connection, in order to illustrate the full value of my above narrative, I think it would be worth while to describe an incident that we experienced on the North West Frontier. In 1919 my regiment was on service in the KHYBER and it was at Landi Khana that we had the chance to learn some thing real of Military life.

Besides the Convoy and camp protection our usual routine at Landi Khana was piquet duty. There were about ten important piquets allotted to the Battalion. It was here that the unfortunate accident through utter negligence and non adherence to training on the part of the N. C. Os in charge of a piquet, called the examining post the Battalion suffered two casualties.

Amids the high hills, near the Durand Line, right up on the gap, the only space on this side of the Frontier, that permits a passage for big forces, we had our examining post.

From this post every morning two men as look-out sentries were sent to remain out for the whole day, in position on a small mound close by the curve of the road between the camp and piquets to watch and cover our people passing that way.

Daily the look-out sentries were sent out, usually at the same hour and exactly to the same position and the N. C. Os incharge of this post had also been neglecting his duty to arrange for covering fire.

Well the N. C. O. incharge of the post might forget what he could, but the enemy was not idle.

One morning the doomed pair was on its way and when it was a question of few yards for them to occupy their usual position, both of them were shot down by two of the tribesmen from the very position they were about to occupy.

As there were no arrangements made for covering fire from the examining post and moreover, as at the same time a part of tribesmen, from some position on Torkham opened fire on the examining post, the two Afridis who shot down our men escaped scot free with all the ammunition on these men and their rifles.

Gentlemen you know this unfortunate accident could have been averted had the principals not been ignored.

On another occasion, about a fortnight after this accident a probability to inflict such a loss to the Battalion was also planned by the tribesmen; but this time, on account of previous loss being alive to the memory of all ranks, every body was alert. The attempt of the tribesmen did not succeed and the Pathans who laid an ambush were taught a lesson. Every now and then some or other loss in life or property on the Frontier provides the troops on service valuable lessons for their future care and guidance.

The Indian Army is fortunate that it has got a real School for its training in the Nallahs and Hills of the Frontier. Had there been no North West Frontier, the fate of the Indian Army would have been otherwise.

I wish the Indian States Forces should also get a chance to learn their lessons in this School of training.

Gentlemen, although it is to dictate to a doctor however, I think as far as an easy way to win war is concerned I have done my best to bring it home to you. Moreover I believe that there is no easier way than the one I have explained. As you sow so shall you reap. The fruit of your success depends on the amount of labour you will entertain in the training of your personals. In case my above explanation of an easy way to win a war appears to be insufficient to any one of you then in that case I suggest a dose of dash and determination to be added to the mixture of training. "Fortune favours the brave" It is a truth and I believe it will remain a truth for ever. History proves that how often merely by dint of determination and self reliance, a force however small in number had won its object against heavy odds.

The Russo-Japanics War, the stubborn resistance by the Spartans offered at the pass of Thermoply, the defensive action of the Rajputs at Chitor against Akbar the great Moghul and the bold stand by a handful of men of the Corps of Guides with the Kabul Embassy are the finest exambles of Chivalry where the highest spirit of dash and determination had been displayed.

Taking into consideration the spirit of dash and determination. I think, the spirit displayed by Mukkarab Khan

a Naik of the 57th Wilds Rifles is one of the best example of its kind to be quoted here.

During the Mutiny 1857, the rebels were driven out from a position they were holding some where in Lucknow. They were about to be safe in their stronghold close behind their position to continue the fight; but were taken aback by Mukkarab Khan at the sacrifice of both his arms. Mukkarab Khan was the first of his party just to reach in time when the doors of the stronghold were about to be closed by the rebels. He thrust his arms right through between the closing doors to offer resistance in their being locked up from inside.

A sharp cut from the other side however cut down his right arm, but the brave fellow undaunted and regardless of his wound at once thrust in his left arm instead. By this time remaining of his party had arrived. The doors at the main entrance of the stronghold were flung open and the rebel having been subdued there and then were taken prisoners. No doubt Mukkarab lost both his arms but after all he had won the day into the bargain for himself and his regiment.

LESSON FROM THE JAPANESE SYSTEM OF MILITARY TRAINING

BY

CAPTAIN SYED AHMAD, EL-EDROOS HYDRABAD DN.

GENTLEMEN,

From the time that the Great War ended to the present day most of the civilised nations of the world are occupied in the remodelling and remaking of their armies because the last war so upset the traditions of warfare that those intrusted with the question of national defence are at their wits end as to what to retain and what to reject.

I will just give you a rough outline of the causes which have placed even these otherwise infallible Gods of Olympus on the horns of a dilemma.

In 1914 hostilities in Europe commenced to all intents and purposes as a war of mobility and rapid decision; but due to the masses of men employed, the scarcity of space and manœuvre and the preponderance of fire power with the consequent success of defence over offence, the fighting evolved into stalemate, and a war of attrition and stagnation ensued. This nightmare of trench and mud, barbed wire and barrages, continued for four years, and the more static the fighting became the greater grew the necessity of armour and the intensity of projectile; and in order to free the struggle from the incubus that clogged its progress, science produced new weapons of destruction and thus we find ourselves left with a legacy of tanks and tractors, mines and motors, aeroplanes and gas, etc, ad-infinity.

Now in order to prevent a re-occurrence of this state of affairs some are trying to make their armies more mobile by mechanization. While some are trying to make war into what they call an exact science, while others following the line of least resistance and are trying to outlaw war all together.

The future can alone decide which of them are on the right path. Although it is, I think, a very ambitious undertaking yet I have tried to study the subject and will today give expression to certain ideas which I have found, regarding one of the many aspects of the vast question.

They might be right, they might be wrong, I give them for what they are worth, and incidentally I wish to confirm whether the conclusion I have drawn are correct.

One of the alternative subjects set by the U. S. I. of India for their prize essay competition this year was. "In view of the number of weapons which the Indian Soldier has to be taught within the short period of his colour service. how do you consider that our present system of training could be so simplified. as to retain what is essential and cut out everything which is unnecessary."

It was this that first gave me the idea, and set me thinking. taking it in a broader aspect that it is the training of the Soldier in general, and not weapon training in particular. I set myself the task of finding an answer to two questions

(1) Were our men being taught everything which is essential to the Soldier,

(2) Was the system on which we are working satisfactory and in keeping with the necessities of modern conditions.

What now follows is an elaborated, answer to these questions.

Let us take it from the very beginning. It is generally admitted that the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest is the foundation of the relationship between all human beings. Accordingly War is a collective struggle for existence, and resorted to when a Nation wishes to impose its will on another, in order to do this a Government has to develop all such resources, that will ensure for her, that strength, which will enable her to overcome the enemy's will to resist.

This strength takes two forms (1) Personnel. (2) Material. At present there is tendency to give more importance to material rather than to personnel.

The rapid progress of science is supposed to be revolutionising warfare in all its aspects, this revolution is not for the better as is generally understood. I might be a bit pessimistic but in my opinion this progress is a delusion, and a mirage, that is luring humanity to its own destruction, because man is fast losing control over his own creation. Inventive genius is in fact replacing muscle with

machines (all these labour saving devices are cases in point) and consequently throwing thousands of mankind out of work, the unemployment question is proof of this. This state of affairs is again in directly breeding such thing like Bolshevism, causing strikes and spreading world wide unrest.

What we can judge from the present progress of mechanization in the Army. War in the future will be one of material rather than personnel. Captain Weber gave us a very vivid picture of what he thought would be in store for the soldier in case of another war, and it was not a very cheery one at that. Whatever others may say yet I firmly believe that as long as war remains to decide the destinies of Nations, the human factor will continue to play the most important part. But at present the progress of Science has so far effected us that it has furnished death with a multitude of disguises in which he will stalk the present day soldier.

A man will stand and fight the devil himself if he appeared in a tangible form, but it is quite a different proposition to be reduced to ashes by electric rays, and mustard gas, or be riddled with bullets by charging tanketes, or to go dodging guns that possess the uncanny power of scenting you out.

Materially and physically man cannot match himself against this menace and face these new weapons of destruction with any hope of success. It is a proved fact that war is a moral weapon and physical conflict in which the soul alone remains unconquered. Therefore what the Soldier now requires is to be equipped with a highly developed and indomitable spirit. There is a well known saying of Napoleon that in War "Moral is to physical as three is to one." This is more applicable today than it was a century ago, and I am even inclined to increase the proportion on the moral side. You will very naturally think that you know this, and that you do possess what we call morale; yes, but considering that others can also possess this quality, we must have something superior, in order to enforce our will on them.

If you were to study the subject with an unbiased mind you will see that this is at present the most neglected part of the Soldier's training. It is nobodys fault, it is the mirage as I said before that is luring us off the track.

when first exposed is the belief, and the later developed pertrait is the conviction a thing you cannot obliterate.

Now working on the hypothesis that a very high standard of moral is required from the Soldier and knowing how this quality can be developed through the medium of his mind I will try and show what part it plays in War.

I divide morale into two catagories, (1) Individual. (2) Collective. The first has to be developed in the Soldier individually and the second should permeate all such bodies of men who collectively go to form an Army. The latter is more important as a factor in War. what I call collective morale is in other words unity of thought. It is a problem of psychology that when many minds concentrate of a single thought that thought takes material form. A very good example of this will be found in the claim recently made by Sir Oliver Lodge, the famous Spiritualist, that he had succeeded in photographing a spirit, does not require saying that only a material thing can be photographed. This claim of his raised a storm of criticism and some of his critics say that it was not a spirit that he photographed but the thoughts of the medium in the material form. How far this is true I do not know, as I never meddle with spirits either in liquid or ethereal form. But this much I know that actions are the visible reactions of thought, that is as you think so you act, accordingly if the same thought occupies many minds the stronger will be their visible reactions. I will give you two examples from the history of Asia to illustrate the point I am driving at and at the same time show what unity of thought can achieve.

In the early part of the 7th century of the Christian era nothing or little was known of Arabia, except that it was a vast desert inhabited by a community of Nomadic tribes, who continually fought amongst themselves, they obeyed no laws, and recognised no King, their religion was vendetta. In the year 1668 A. D. a new religion was preached from Medina, within a hundred years the world was destined to witness a phenomena, these very same men are ruling the World from the Spain in the West to China in the East, what worked this miracle let us stop a moment and see it was unity of thought the most diverse minds united in one thought had developed a unity of purpose which no obstacle was strong enough to stop.

Take the case of Japan and her rapid rise to World prominence within the last half a century, we will find that the cause and the effect are the same. A religion of patriotism carefully developed throughout all ranks of her society bring her to the forefront of Modern Nations.

I will give a few examples from these peoples as they are essentially a Military nation and go to great pains in developing and maintaining a martial spirit, not only in the Soldiers but also in their rising generation. As such they can give us some useful lessons. I will read out to you few extracts from various authors who have studied the Japanese from a Military point of view.

Captain Kennedy a language Officer attached to the Japanese Army, has written a very interesting book called "The Military Side of the Japanese Life." In one place he mentions, writing about Moral—"In the Japanese Army the training in morale forms a very important part of the Soldiers education. Every possible precatation being taken to inculcate what are known as the "seven duties of the Soldier' namely—loyalty, valour, patriotism, obedience, humility, morality and honour. Ceremonial parades are one of the ways used to inculcate these duties. Other methods employed being the taking of men to see places of Historical; interest the personal influence of the Officers and N. C O.'s putting up of texts in the barracks rooms on the subjects of the Soldier's duty to the Emperor and his country and so on." By these and a dozen other methods the Japanese soldiers has the "training of moral" drummed into him from the time he enters the barracks.

If you will remember Major Garston made a remark in his lecture, that after the war it was noticed that the care-of-arms was being neglected to a great extent. Now let us see (what means would you adopt to ensure that they are well looked after in your regiment).

Now I will tell you how the Japanese tackle this problem by quoting the same author. He writes "A curious ceremony which takes place shortly after the entry of a new batch of recruits, and one which is really a part of their moral training is the handing over of rifles to them. Each Company brings a long wooden table on to the parade ground, the rifles being laid on these tables. The recruits fall in on parade and are then lectured to by their respective Company Commanders who impress on them that it is

the sacred duty of a Soldier to keep his rifle and equipment clean and in good order and that he must look after it as though it were his own soul, a thing to be kept clean and unsullied, each recruit is then called out in turn and presented with a rifle. The Company Commanders speech certainly seems to have the desired effect. The Japanese Soldier takes infinite pains to keep his rifles clean and in good order and a very noticeable point on all training and manoeuvres is the care taken by the men to keep their rifles from touching muddy or sandy ground. You compare the two methods and judge for yourselves which is better.

This brings me to another point, our system is more or less based on the principle of punishments and rewards, this is rather an old system and I think was suitable to the past when the self consciousness of men was not so far awakened, but today the mentality of the human race has so far developed, that it is far better to appeal to their feelings. This will have a more lasting effect and generally produces better results than either the fear of punishment or the avarice of reward. Writing about route marches Kennedy says "The route march has been mentioned as a further example of how education in martial spirit is constantly brought into even the every day routine duties of the Japanese Soldiers, and is introduced in such a way that he does not realise that it is all part and parcel of his training. Visits to places of Historical interest are frequently carried out with this end in view, lectures being given at the same time, in order to bring out some particular lesson to be learnt from events connected with these places. Again he says the foreign Military observers who attend their manoeuvres are afforded opportunities of seeing for themselves the personnel and forming his own conclusion as to the state of their morale, their power of endurance, their physique and their discipline. None who has seen the conduct of the troops on these manoeuvres can doubt that the men themselves are the best possible material for which any Army Commander could wish."

You all must have gleaned from the extracts I have read out to you the principles on which their system is based; now I will show you the results achieved from this system of training.

Commenting on their spirit-de-corps, Kennedy, gives the following account of an Officer—"A case occurred during

the three years of my stay in Japan of an Infantry Officer who fell out on a route march. It was a case of sheer fatigue and nothing else, but when he had recovered he went to his Commanding Officer and apologised and asked him to punish him. The C. O., however, knowing the facts of the case, refused to do so, and merely told him to get himself into better training for long distance marching. Not content with this, the Officer again asked to be punished, and on the C. O. still refusing his request, he went home and wrote a letter saying that he considered it a disgrace to his regiment to have an officer who had fallen out on the line of march and that he had decided to retrieve the good name of the regiment by relieving it of himself; and having done this he took his life." There are several other cases of this kind which could be quoted but as they are more or less the same I think one is sufficient to bring out the lesson.

I will now give you an extract which will give you an idea of morale as it effects them collectively. Kuropatkin the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Field Army, during the Russo-Japanese War writes as follows—"Though our informations as to the material points of the enemy's strength can hardly be described as good, we very much underestimated—if we did not entirely over look its moral side, we paid no attention to the fact that for many years the education of the Japanese people had been carried out in a martial spirit and on patriotic lines, we saw nothing in the educational methods of a country where the children in the elementary schools are taught to love their Nation and to be heroes. The Nations belief in, and deep respect for, the Army—the individuals willingness and pride in serving the iron discipline among all ranks and the influence of the Samurai spirit, escaped our notice, while we attached no importance to the intense feeling of resentment that we aroused when we deprived the Japanese of the fruits of their victory in China. True when hostilities began we did see all these things but it was too late, and at that time when the War was neither popular with nor understood by our Nation, the whole manhood of Japan was responding with unanimous enthusiasm to the call to arms. There were instances of mothers committing suicide when their sons were rejected on medical grounds. A call for volunteers for a forlorn hope produced hundreds ready to face certain death. While many officers and men had their funeral rites performed before leaving for the front, to show their

intention of dying for their country; those who were taken prisoners at the commencement of the operations committed suicide. The one idea of the youth of Japan was to serve in the Army, all the great families tried to do some thing for their country either by giving their children to it or by providing money. This spirit produced regiments which threw themselves upon our obstacles with a shout of Banzai broke through them, and throwing the corpses of their comrades into the trous-de-loup climbed over them on to our works. The Nation as well as the Soldiers felt the vital importance of the War, appreciated the reasons for which it was being fought, and spared no sacrifice to overcome their enemy and to obtain victory. In this and in the co-operation of the Nation, with the Army and the Government lay the strength which brought Japan victory. And it was with an Army weakened by the feeling of opposition in its own country that we had to face the armed might of such a Nation." This, Gentlemen, is the tribute paid to the morale of the Japanese Army by one of the enemy, and in this you will find that unity of thought weaves a nemesis like web in which are trapped the doomed armies of Russia. Sir Ian Hamilton in his "Staff Officers Scrap Book" describing the Battles of Lionyang says—"But it will be generally accepted that the Japanese Army after the events of the the past month must have had some advantage here, but the more I think the more certain am I that it was not tactics, or strategy, or armament, or information, which won the battle of Lionyang for Omay, but it was rather the soules of the Japanese troops which triumphed over the less developed, less awakened, less stimulated spiritual qualities of the Russians."

These extracts that I have read out to you convey their own meaning and require no more explanation. Gentlemen, compare these men with our own and you will understand why I said that we were neglecting the most important part of the training of our Soldiers.

Presuming that I have made myself clear and explained what qualities are required in the Soldier, how can we develop these qualities, and when developed what you can expect of them, I leave it to you to devise means of thier application to the men under your command; for no hard and fast rules can be laid down, because, so much depends upon the racial, religious, and traditional peculiarities of the men that compose our forces.

Before I conclude my lecture there is one more point on which I want to lay great stress, although I fear I am treading on very tender ground yet I can not help mentioning it.

I have noticed not only among our own officers but also amongst officers of the other State Forces that there exists an idea that they have no object in life but are like dressed up dolls kept up, for purposes of show or at the most to play a second fiddle to the police force and as such they think there is no necessity of taking the trouble of improving themselves or their men, because their efforts are seldom appreciated, this feeling in us reflects on our men and as long as it exists there is very little hope of improvement.

Take it like this, what after all is an army kept up for but to safe guard the interest of the state by protecting its trade and social life from foreign interference or internal disorder.

Our states as they stand form an integral part of the British Empire, and as such their interests are interdependent. Therefore it is logical to conclude that the State Forces are an integral part of the scheme of Imperial Defence and like the machine which is dependant on every little screw for the efficiency of its running, the Empire is dependant on us for something at least.

Therefore we are not so useless as we are inclined to think. Remember what I said before, induce your mind to take the brightest aspect of things and you will soon find these imaginary ills disappearing. For in your surroundings you see reflected the thoughts that your mind creates, and since the making of your mind lies in your own hand make the best of it.

"LEST WE FORGET"

THE

P O E M

BY

CAPTAIN SAYYAD AHMAD EDROOS

OF

HYDARABAD (Dn.)

LEST WE FORGET.

THE S. O. S. JAIPUR 1928.

Soon we'll hear the trumpet blast,
The course is ending soon at last
Back you to, your regiments go
Take this as a memento.

I'll try to describe to you
What we had in class to do
Well you know it yet
This will remind—"Lest we forget"

Should you ever get the blue
Take this out and read it thro',
It will cheer you for a bit
And help you, overcome the fit.

Much we saw and more did eat
Turn out very smart and neat
Strange how in fourteen weeks
We all put on such rosy cheeks

We heard of the Lewis and Vicker Gun
Saw the eclipses of the Sun
At the Club we heard the band
Saw Forts and Palaces grim and grand.

Saw and rode the Armoured Car
Learn the use of Pick and Bar
To move in diamond and in square
And in battle to do and dare.

Outdoor schemes and tout we had
They were never all too bad
Except when we were told
To tackle breakfast that was cold.

We heard of Gas that made you weep
 And lectures that put you to sleep
 Of tankettes that came charging thro'
 And sent you flying into the blue.

We were taught to play in sand
 Copy any shape of land
 Draw to scale and draw a sketch.
 And out imagination stretch.

We wanted to inforce our will
 When asked to pay our hotel bill
 Some one always had a grouse
 In their clothes they found a mouse.

We heard of the A.C. and Bomber plan
 Who could, much, information gain
 They photograph the hill and dale
 Which to us conveyed, nor head nor tail.

We heard of DADOS and Q. M. G's
 Who were very fond of using D' S
 If we did not always apply
 To daddy for the next supply

Told not break a solemn pledge
 With director not to hedge
 Give a solution cut and dry
 We had but once to do and die.

It is so easy to march at night
 When lost, is the sense of taste and sigh
 It's the bears and jackals chief delight
 To see you fire a very light.

If you want a surprise to springe
 Don't forget the Pyjama string
 A prisoner you can safely bind
 By coupling up his fore and hind

Once we climbed Amagrah' Hill
 The imaginary Afridy to kill
 And when at last we reached the crest
 T'was with knocking knees and heaving chest

If ever a quarrel should commence
 Make use of your intelligence
 The chance you should never miss
 To patch up with a timely kiss.

If in this you do not succeed
 In other ways, you can proceed
 Try a hand at camouflaging
 Or put round her a box barrage.

My bachelor friends this is not for you
 You won't require patching to do
 But if to woo you have begun
 Then approach her behind the creeping one

I wonder if we will live or die
 Tackling Afridi Bug and TsTse fly
 The Doctor has now a problem set
 To count holes in a mosquito net

Guess the Riddle of the R. E.
 Only mental pictures of him you see
 In peace time he does not exist
 In war none can him resist.

His job is one long holiday
 He bridges over from work to play.
 He attends only to an urgent call
 It's each for himself God for us all.

A long life to the A. S. C.
 They feed us on Dall, Rice and Ghee
 Beer, Lemons and frozen meat
 Even for the Gods a real treat.

Yes, what you say is very true
If you expect us our best to do
Pay us well and feed us well
Lead, and we will follow even to hell.

You are so good so very kind
A small request you should not mind
We will not loot, we will not beg
But give us each day our daily peg.

*Syed wishes you now good cheer
And drink your health in ginger beer
Good luck-be happy and gay
Au-revoir we will meet some day.*

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

THE WEEKLY PROGRAMME.

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work, Week ending 6th October, 1928.

Date.	Time.	Work.	References.	Remarks.
Monday October 1st	0730 1000 1130	Opening Address. Map Reading Lecture No. 1. Lecture Principles of War.	M.M.R.F.S. Chap. 3-7, 13 F. S. R. Sec. 2-6	
Tuesday October 2nd	0700 1000 1130	Lecture appreciations. Map Reading Lecture No. 2. Lecture Protection on the move.	T. & M. R. Sec. 25. M.M.R.F. Chap. 15, 19, 21 F.S.R. II Secs. 43-50. I. T. II Secs. 27-30.	
Wednesday October 3rd	0630 1000 1130	Scheme Map Reading. Lecture Protection at Rest. Lecture Squared and Gridded Maps.	{ F. S. R. II Secs. 55-60. I. T. II Secs 31-39. M.M.R.F.S. Chap. 8.	Rendezvous — Jhotwara.
Thursday October 4th	0630 1000 1130	Scheme Map Reading. Lecture Reconnaissance. Lecture withdrawals and Rear guards.	{ F.S.R. Vol. II Sec. 33-42 F.S.R. II Secs. 51-54, 110 I. T. II Secs. 30.	Rendezvous — Reservoir.
Friday October 5th	0630 1000 1130	Demonstration Company as an Advanced Guard. Lecture Organisation of a Unit. Lecture Organisation of the Army.	{	Rendezvous — S9464.
Saturday October 6th	0645 1165	Scheme — Advanced Guards. Lecture Training.	T. & M. R. Secs. 1-3, 7-11, 15, 16, 17.	Rendezvous — Level crossing near 3½ mile road, Jaipur, — Sangaur.

Jaipur, dated 29th September, 1928.

Captain, Commandant.
Senior Officers' School, Indian State Forces, D.P.S.

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work, Week ending 13th October, 1928.

Date.	Time.	Work.	References.	Remarks.
Monday October 8th	0700	Lecture "Reports and Messages".	Pamphlet on Abbreviations etc. pages 28, 29, 47-57, F. S. P. B. pages 59-65.	0
Tuesday October 9th	1000	Vickers Gun Lecture No. 1.	C.T. Vol. Chap. 2 & 4.	Rendezvous, S 9464
	1115	Cavalry Lecture No. 1.		
Wednesday October 10th	0730	Demonstration Outpost Company.	Pamphlet on Abbreviations etc. pages 29-40.	Rendezvous, road bridge front of Infantry quarter guard.
	1030	Vickers Gun Lecture 2.		
Thursday October 11th	1130	Lecture Orders.	C. T. Vol. II Chap. 3.	Rendezvous 4th mile Road Jaipur Sanganer.
	0730	Vickers Gun Demonstration Outpost Company.		
Friday October 12th	1145	Cavalry Lecture No. 2, War Dairy.	F.S.R. II Chap. VIII.	Rendezvous, Rifles Butts Infy. range.
	0730	Scheme Outposts.		
Saturday October 13th	1145	Practise writing orders and messages (In doors).	L. T. II Chap. II.	Lecture 3rd period by Lieut. Colonel Thakur Balu Singh
	0730	Cavalry 1st Demonstration.		
	1130	Attack Lecture No. 1.	C. T. Vol. II Chap. 10 and 11.	Sardar Bahadur, I. D. S. M.
	0730	Attack Lecture No. 2.		
	1030	Cavalry Lecture No. 3, "Cavalry action in future Wars."		
	1200	Lecture "With the Ganga Rissala in the Sinai Peninsula."		

Dated Jaipur, H. O., the 5th October, 1928.

Captain, Commandant,
Senior Officers' School, Indian State Forces.

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work. Week ending 25th October, 1928.

Name.	Time.	Work.	References.	Remarks.
Monday October 15th	0730	Cavalry Demonstration No. 2.	...	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Moti Dongri.
		Lecture Night Operations.	...	Lecture by Lieut. Col. Gurdial Singh I. D. S. M.
Tuesday October 16th	0730 1200	Scheme Cavalry in a Protective Role. Group Photograph of the Officers S. O. S.	...	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Taiga ki Chauki S 7136.
Wednesday October 17th	0730 1100	Demonstration Company in the attack. Lecture March Discipline.	F. S. R. II 150-152, 155, 156.	<i>Rendezvous</i> — S 8856
Thursday October 18th	0730 1130	Scheme attack. Artillery Lecture No. 1.	...	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Road bridge in front of Infantry. Quarter-Guard.
Friday October 19th	0730 1000 1130	Defence Lecture No. 1. Artillery Lecture No. 2. Lecture Indian State Forces.	F. S. R. II Secs. 86-92 97-99, 104. I. T. II, Secs. 19, 20.	Lecture 3rd period by Lieut. Col. Th. Devi Singh.
Saturday October 20th	0730 1000 1130	Artillery Lecture No. 3. Defence Lecture No. 2. Artillery Lecture No. 4.	F. S. R. II, Secs. 93-96 100-103. I. T. II, Secs. 21-25.	

*Captain, Commandant,
Senior Officers' School, Indian State Forces.*

Dated Jaipur, H. O., the 12th October, 1928.

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES,

Programme of Work, Week ending 27th October 1928.

Time.	Time.	Work.	Referecs.	Remarks.
Wednesday October 24th		Monday October 22nd to Wednesday, 24th Dasahra Holidays.		
Thursday October 25th	0730 1130	Scheme Defence Lecture "Operation on the N. W. Frontier."	...	Rendezvous-5th mile road Jaipur-Ajmer Lecture by Major Balwant Singh.
Friday October 26th	0730 1000 1130	Lecture "Tactical Exercises without Troops" Signalling Lecture No. 1. Lecture "Sand Model."	T. & M. Regs. Secs. 15-17. T. & M. Regs. (13, 16, 36)	
Saturday October 27th	0730 1000 1130	Lecture "Bush & Desert Fighting." Signalling Lecture No. 2. Scheme Sand Model.	F.S.R. Vol. II, 134-146	

Jaipur, dated 19th October 1928.

Senior Officers' School. Indian State Forces, D.P.S.
Captain, Commandant.

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work ending 10th November, 1928.

Date.	Time.	Work.	References.	Remarks.
Monday November 5th	0730 1000 1200	Demonstration. Firing point and Butt duties and Discipline. Demonstration. Fire orders and their application Lecture "Life of H. H. the Late Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior." Scheme Attack.	... Lecturer Major Yashwant Rao Bhonsle. Lieut.-Colonel Thakur Balu Singh I.D.S.M. and Major Baldeo Singh Pathania.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —Infantry Range. <i>Rendezvous</i> Garden by 4½ mile road Jaipur—Sanganer.
Tuesday November 6th	0730 1130	Sand-Model Scheme by No. 2, Syndicate.	... Lecturer Major K. M. Kadam.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —6th mile road Jaipur-Ajmer
Wednesday November 7th	0730 1130	Scheme Attack. Lecture "Use of ground in the attack."	... Lieut.-Colonel Gurdial Singh I.D.S.M. and Lieut. Imran Shah Khan M.O. N.W.F.I. Ch. I, 2, 3, II.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —3rd mile road Jaipur-Ajmer. <i>Rendezvous</i> —3rd mile road Jaipur-Ajmer.
Thursday Nov. 8th Friday November 9th	0730 1130	Scheme Convoys. Sand-Model Scheme by No. 1, Syndicate. Scheme Advanced-Guard. Hill Warfare lecture No. 1.	... M. O. N. W. F. I. Ch. 5 Secs. 18-25, Ch 7, 8. Lecturer Major Baldeo Singh Pathania.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —Infantry Lines.
Saturday November 10th	0730 1000 1130	Demonstration. Striking camp and start of March. Hill warfare Lecture No. 2. Lecture, "Platoon in Battle."		

Jaipur, dated 2nd November, 1928.

*Captain, Commandant,
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SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work, Week ending 24th November, 1928.

Date.	Time.	Work.	References.	Remarks.
Monday November 19th	0730 1000	Lecture "Easy way to win war." Smoke and Gas Lecture No. 1.	Capt. Syed Nazir Ali.	
	1130	Lecture "Cavalry in Hill Warfare."	M.O.N.W.F.I. Sec. 10, 16.60. F.S.R. Secs. 121, etc.	
Tuesday November 20th	0730 1000	Gas Lecture No. 2. Hill Warfare Lecture No. 4.	M.O.N.W.F.I.Ch.7,8,9.	
Wednesday November 21st.	1130 0730 1000	Royal Air Force Lecture No. 1. Sand model Scheme by No. 3, Syndicate. Demonstration of Types of ambushes on the sand model.		
	1130	Royal Air Force Lecture No. 2.		
Thursday November 22nd	0730	Attack Scheme.	Major Balwant Singh Capt. Sardar Jwala Singh.	Rendezvous—4th mile Road Jaipur—San- ganer.
Friday November 23rd	1130 0800 1130	Lecture "Ordnance Duties in Peace." Scheme Advance through Hills. Lecture "Ordnance in War."	M. O. N. W. F. I. Secs. 18-23.	Rendezvous—4½ mile Road Jaipur—Kanota
Saturday November 24th	0730 1130	Attack in Hill Warfare. Lecture "Information and Intelligence."	M.O.N.W.F.I. Ch. 7. Capt. Sardar Jwala Singh.	Rendezvous—T 3550.

Jaipur, dated 16th November, 1928.

*Captain, Commandant—
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SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work. Week ending 1st December, 1928.

Programme of Work. Week ending 1st December, 1928.				
Date.	Time.	Work.	References.	Remarks.
Monday November 26th	0730	Scheme Cavalry in pursuit.	Maj. Hayat Mir Khan Capt. Dhorak Ram. F.S.R.II, Secs. 116-119 I. T. II, Secs 53-54	<i>Rendezvous</i> —5th mile Road, Jaipur-Ajmer
	1130	Night Operations Lecture No. 2.		
Tuesday Nov. 27th	...	Holiday on account of Birthday of Guru Nanak Sahib.		
Wednesday November 28th	0730	Scheme Cavalry before and during the battle.	...	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Road Junction T 0539.
	1130	Lecture "Lessons from the Japanese System of Military Training."		
Thursday November 29th	0730	Scheme Advance Guard.	Capt. Syed Ahmad El. Edroos.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —Jhorla Kund S 9764.
	1130	Lecture "Leadership".	Major Raghbir Singh I.D.S.M. Capt. Syed Nazir Ali.	
Friday November 30th	0730	Scheme "Description of a village."	Capt. Abdul Jabbar Khan.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —3rd mile road Jaipur-Kanota
	1130	Lecture "Sanitation in the Field."	M.O.N.W.F.I. Ch. 9.	
Saturday December 1st	0800	Demonstration "Platoon advancing up a hill, and taking up a picket position and withdrawing"	...	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Knoll 2½ mile road Jaipur-Kanota.
	1130	Lecture "Evacuation of casualties in the Field"		

Dated Jaipur, H. O. the 23.12.28

Dated Jaipur, H. O. the 23rd November, 1928.

Senior Officers' School. Indian State Forces, D.P.S.
Captain, Commandant.

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work, Week ending 8th December, 1928.

Date.	Time.	Work.	References.	Remarks.
Monday December 3rd	0800 1130 2130	Officers to carry out a Reconnaissance for a Mighty Advance. Practise Verbal Orders and quick appreciation on sand-model. Night March.	F. S. R. Secs. 114-118, 119.	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Resi- dency.
Tuesday Dec. 4th	1130	Lecture Umpiring.	... T. & M. Rags 76-SS.	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Given out after Recon- naissance.
Wednesday December 5th	0730 1130	Scheme Cavalry Reconnaissance. Lecture "Care of Animals."	Major Bhosle Captain Pernaik. Animal management Ch. 4, 5, 6, 10. N.O.W.F.I. Secs. 26-29	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Reser- voir.
Thursday Dec. 6th	0800 1130	Scheme Perimeter Camp. Field Engineering Lecture No. 1.		<i>Rendezvous</i> —3rd mile road, Jaipur-Kanota
Friday December 7th	0800 1130	Scheme Advanced Guard. Field Engineering Lecture No. 2.		<i>Rendezvous</i> —5th mile road Jaipur-Kanota
Saturday December 8th	0800 1130	Demonstration Launching an Assault Bridge. Lecture "Battery Reconnaissance and Occupa- tion of a position."	... Capt. Dherak Ram	<i>Rendezvous</i> — Trans- port Garden.

Dated Jaipur, H.O., the 30th November, 1928.

Senior Officers' School. Indian State Forcee, D.P.S.,
Captain, Commandant,

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.

INDIAN STATE FORCES.

Programme of Work, Week ending 15th December, 1928.

Date.	Time.	Works.	References.	Remarks.
Monday, Dec. 10th	0800 1130	Scheme Umpiring. Sand model Scheme by No. 4. Syndicate.	...	<i>Rendezvous</i> —to be notified later.
Tuesday December 11th	0800 1030 1130	Lecture "Section of a Camp Site." Lecture "Short History of the development of Supplies and Transport." Practise appreciations and verbal orders on the sand model.	Lieut. Inuran Shah Khan.	
Wednesday December 12th	0800 1130	Scheme Cavalry at Rear guard Mounted Troops. Lecture "Supplies and Transport in the Field."	Maj. K. M. Kadam. Capt. Syed Ahmad El Edroos.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —Hangra (S 68.)
Thursday December 13th	0800 1130	Scheme Counter attack and withdrawal. Lecture "Squadron and Company Training."	P.S.R.L. Page 15. W.E. (India) Table 111 P.S.R. II. Secs. 97, 100	<i>Rendezvous</i> —9th mile road Jaipur-Ajmer
Friday December 14th	0800 1100 1230	Scheme Hill Piquetting. Discussion "How far will Mechanization affect conduct of future Wars." Final Address.	M.O.N.W.F.I. Secs. 20, 23. Major N. H. Kadam will initiate the discussion.	<i>Rendezvous</i> —Sheet 259, Harper ki Dahi (M. 73).
Saturday Dec. 15th		SCHOOL CLOSES.		

Jaipur, dated 7th December, 1928.

Senior Officers' School, Indian State Forces, D.P.S.
Captain, Commandant.

APPENDIX—II

The books necessary at the Senior Officers School.

1. Field Service Pocket Book, part II 1926.
 2. Artillery Training Vol. III 1921 (Provisional).
 3. Cavalry Training Vol. II "War" 1920.
 4. Manual of Field Works (All Arms) 1925.
 6. Machine Gun Training 1925.
 7. Manual of Operations on the N. W. F. of India 1925.
 8. Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching 1921.
 9. Field Service Regulation Vol. I 1923.
 10. Field Service Regulation Vol. II 1924.
 11. Training & Manoeuvres Regulations 1923.
 12. Engineer Training Vol II. 1926.
 13. Army Manual of Sanitation 1926.
 14. Abbreviations & Instructions for the Drafting of Orders, Instructions, Reports and Message.
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Note:— Officers are advised to take with them field Glasses, Note Books, Message Books, and good Compasses.

APPENDIX—III.

List of the candidates who attended the S. O. S. in 1928.

MAJOR BALDEO SINGH PATHANIA,
Director of Military Training,
Jammu and Kashmir State Forces.

CAPTAIN DHERAK RAM,
Kashmir Pack Artillery.

Punjab Circle.

MAJOR BALWANT SINGH,
Jind Infantry Battalion.

LIEUT-COL. GURDIAL SINGH.
1st Patiala Infantry.

CAPTAIN JAWALA SINGH,
Kapurthala Jagatjit Infantry.

LIEUT. IMRAN SHAH KHAN.
1st Rampur Infantry.

Central India Circle.

CAPTAIN ABDUL JAB-BAR KHAN.
Bhopal Victoria Lancers.

MAJOR. YESHWANT RAO BHOSLE.
2nd Gwalior Lancers.

CAPTAIN PARNAIK,
Gwalior Infantry.

MAJOR M. KADAM.
Indore Infantry.

Rajputana Circle.

LIEUT-COL. THAKER DEVI SINGH.
Corps Commander. Infantry & Transport, Jaipur.

Central Corps Circle.

LIEUT-COL. BALI SINGH.
Commandant, Bikaner Svd. Light Infantry.

CAPTAIN SYED NAZEER ALI SHAH.

Adjutant 2nd. Bahawalpur Haroon Infantry.

Sapper Circle

MAJOR RAGHBIR SINGH I.D.S.M.

COMDT. FARIDKOT SAPPERS.

Kathiawar Circle

MAJOR HAYAT MIR KHAN,

Junagarh Lancers.

Southern India Circle

CAPTAIN SYED AHMAD,

Hydarabad 2nd I. S. Lancers.

